I am developing a series of 12 workshops for solicitors, which I will present in London, between 2-5pm, monthly.
Each workshop is limited to 10 delegates, and the fee is £500 plus VAT per workshop. A further announcement will be made about dates and how to book in November.
The workshop topics are:
- Principles and concepts
- Legal framework and jurisdiction
- Applications, remedies, and powers of the court
- Burden of proof
- Legal tests
- Expert evidence
- How cases are decided -approach of the court
- Procedural rules and Practice Directions
- Mediation (see below)
‘Mediation in a mental capacity dispute’
By Carl Islam, Barrister TEP, SCMA accredited mediation advocate, 1 Essex Court (www.ihtbar.com)
- Deprivation of liberty
- BME Mediation
This seminar is based upon an article jointly written with Dr Hugh Series DM, FRCPsych, LLM, MB, BS, MA. Consultant old age psychiatrist, Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust; Member, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford; Member, First tier tribunal (mental health) (www.hughseries.co.uk), entitled ‘The Advocate and the Expert in the Court of Protection’, published in the Expert Witness Journal (Autumn 2018 edition). A copy can be downloaded on the Publications page at www.ihtbar.com.
As outlined at the end of the article, I have developed a new technique, called ‘BME Mediation’, for the amicable resolution of trust and estate disputes (which will be fully outlined in my forthcoming book for the Law Society, the ‘Contentious Trusts Handbook’. Please visit the handbook page at www.ihtbar,com for more information.
‘BME’ stands for ‘beginning’, ‘middle’, and ‘end’.
In this talk I outline how the technique can be applied in a Court of Protection (‘COP’) mediation in relation to a mental capacity dispute. Unless otherwise stated all statutory references are to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘MCA), and the person over whom the court has jurisdiction is referred to as ‘P’.
- Hundreds of thousands of people in England and Wales are being unlawfully deprived of their liberty.
- Applications for DOLS have been growing very fast year on year since the DOLS were introduced in 2009.
- In 2015–16 there were 195,840 applications.
- Appeals against a DOLS authorization may be made to the COP under section 21A MCA.
- In relation to people deprived of their liberty outside hospitals or care homes, for example in in supported living arrangements or hostels, the application for authorization must be made directly to the COP.
- In 2017 there were 3,955 DOL applications to the court, a rise of 27% compared to 2016.
- The law on deprivation of liberty has gone through a profound transformation in the last 20 years, and at the time of writing a Bill is going through Parliament which is likely to change it again.
- The Mental Health Act is also being reviewed currently.
- The future position on deprivation of liberty is uncertain.
- For current project status please see ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty’ at https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/mental-capacity-and-deprivation-of-liberty/
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY
In the article Dr Series states,
‘The COP has power to make declarations and decisions on behalf of a person who lacks capacity. One area of the court’s work which is growing very rapidly is deprivation of liberty (DOL) … People lacking capacity who are deprived of liberty in hospitals or care homes must have that deprivation authorized by the local authority. The number of applications for DOLS has been growing very fast year on year since the DOLS were introduced in 2009, and for the year 2015–16 there were 195,840 applications. Appeals against a DOLS authorization may be made to the COP under section 21A MCA. In relation to people deprived of their liberty outside hospitals or care homes, for example in in supported living arrangements or hostels, the application for authorization must be made directly to the COP. In 2017 there were 3,955 DOL applications to the court, a rise of 27% compared to 2016. As applications for authorization should be made for everyone who lacks capacity and is deprived of liberty, and as this will include many people with dementia or intellectual disability, these figures, although large, are likely to be substantially less than the number that should be made. A largely unexplored question relates to the position of those who are in fact deprived of liberty but for whom no application has been made.
The law on deprivation of liberty has gone through a profound transformation in the last 20 years, and at the time of writing a Bill is going through Parliament which is likely to change it again. The story begins in 1953 with the coming into force of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed by the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, including the UK. The context at that time was the terrible events of the Second World War. Article 5 of the Convention limits the circumstances under which a person may properly be deprived of his liberty, one of which is that the person is of unsound mind. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty has a right under ECHR article 5(4) to speedy access to a court capable of ordering his discharge. Patients with mental disorder who required treatment in hospital can be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA), even if they are refusing treatment. The MHA automatically gives patients the right to appeal to a tribunal, satisfying the article 5 requirement. Until 1997, if they lacked capacity to consent to treatment and did not appear to be objecting, patients were usually admitted informally and treated on the basis of the doctrine of necessity, that is, that it was in their best interests to receive treatment. However, the landmark case of Bournewood challenged that position by asserting that it was a breach of article 5 to hold a person lacking capacity in hospital on the basis that it was necessary and in his best interests, without further authorization. The case went through the English courts to the House of Lords, as it then was, and was then appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, which found that there had been a breach of article 5 in those circumstances because there was no mechanism by which the person deprived of liberty could speedily appeal to a court (HL v The United Kingdom 45508/99  ECHR 720).
Parliament responded in 2007 by bringing in the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) which are set out in schedules 1A and A1 of the MCA, together with a Code of Practice. Under these procedures, the ward manager (for patients in hospital) of anyone who lacks capacity and is deprived of liberty must seek authorization for the deprivation. The ward manager can authorize urgent deprivation for up to seven days, renewable for a further 7 days while an application to the local authority is made for authorization of the deprivation of liberty for longer periods. The local authority must send two assessors, one of whom must be a doctor, to investigate whether six qualifying requirements are met. These are: the person is aged 18 or more; lacks capacity; has a mental disorder; there are no relevant objections; the deprivation is in the patient’s best interests; and the person is ‘not ineligible’ for detention under MHA. At the time that these procedures were introduced it was anticipated that there would not be very many applications. However, following the landmark judgment in Cheshire West (P v Cheshire West and P and Q v Surrey County Council  UKSC 19), where the meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ was clarified as being a state of continuous supervision and control where the patient was not free to leave, the number of applications for DOLS authorizations escalated to the point where local authorities across the country were (and are) unable to meet the requests for authorizations, with the result that the statutory time limits for authorization cannot be met and large numbers of people in hospitals, care homes, and elsewhere are, strictly speaking, being deprived of their liberty unlawfully. A House of Lords post legislative scrutiny committee concluded that the present law is ‘not fit for purpose’. The government accepts that this is an unworkable position and, following a consultation by the Law Commission, has introduced a Bill to Parliament with the aim of simplifying and streamlining the process.
At the time of writing the position is that hundreds of thousands of people in England and Wales are being unlawfully deprived of their liberty, either because those responsible for the deprivation have not sought authorization from the local authority (or, in the case of those deprived of liberty outside hospitals or care homes, directly from the Court of Protection), or because the local authority has not yet been able to carry out the necessary assessments. These include people with disorders such as dementia and learning disability in care homes and supported living arrangements. Some of these people are in psychiatric hospitals, where a decision must be made between detention under MHA and deprivation of liberty using DOLS. A patient who lacks capacity but appears to be objecting to all or part of the treatment is ineligible for DOLS and therefore MHA must be used. In general hospitals, the legal position is particularly difficult. Patients who lack capacity because of delirium or other medical causes (probably a very large group), those under general anesthetics, and the majority of those in intensive care units would appear to be being deprived of their liberty according to the definition in Cheshire West, and very few of them have had their deprivation authorized in the required way, which may suggest that they may be unlawfully deprived of liberty. At present, people who die while subject to a deprivation of liberty authorization are considered to have died in state detention, and the death must be referred to the coroner irrespective of the views or feelings of the family. The case of Ferreira (Regina (Ferreira) v Inner South London Senior Coroner  EWCA Civ 31) concerned a woman who had died while being intubated in ICU. Although she had not had a deprivation of her liberty authorized under the procedures in the MCA, nor was she detained under the MHA, it was argued that, as she had died in state detention, her death should be reported to the coroner for an inquest. However, the Court of Appeal found that her physical condition and the lifesaving treatment which she required was responsible for her loss of liberty, rather than the state, and therefore she was not in ‘state detention’, and her death did not have to be referred to the coroner.
The Mental Health Act is also being reviewed currently. The future position on deprivation of liberty is uncertain.’
The defining issues in any mental capacity dispute in the COP are:
- The analytical starting point is that:
- capacity is ultimately a question of fact for the court to decide on the balance of probabilities with a presumption of capacity; and
- an adult is presumed to have the mental capacity to make a particular decision, until the contrary is proved, Section 1(2) (the rebuttable Statutory Presumption).
- In arriving at a determination, the judge must answer the question, what is in the best interests of P?
- Expert evidence is only opinion.
- The judge is free to reject expert opinion.
- Two fundamental concepts underly the scheme and purpose of Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”);
(i) ‘lack of capacity’; and
(ii) ‘best interests’.
- These are private law issues.
- Whilst the COP’s powers under s.16 in relation to P’s personal welfare extend to deciding where P is to live, the COP has no power to decide any public law issue.
- A person will lack capacity if any of the four limbs of s.3(1)(a) to (d) is satisfied.
- The definition of capacity in MCA 2005 is intended to build on, rather than contradict, the terms of pre-existing common law tests.
- The Code of Practice to the MCA (the ‘Code’) suggests that, as cases come before the court, Judges may adopt the statutory definition in they see fit and use it to develop common law rules in particular cases.
- In applying the test for capacity set out in Sections 2 to 3 to determine whether an individual has capacity to make a particular decision, the Code advises that a two-stage procedure must be applied:
(i) it must be established that there is an impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the person’s mind or brain, and
(ii) it must be established that the impairment or disturbance is sufficient to render the person unable to make that particular decision at the relevant time.
- The ‘causative nexus’ is crucial.
- Whether the diagnostic aspect is considered before the functional aspect, or afterwards, the determinative question is always whether there is a sufficient causative link between the identified impairment or disturbance and any functional inability to take the decision in question.
- The true question is whether the impairment/disturbance of mind is an effective, material or operative cause.
- Dose it cause the incapacity, even if other factors come into play?
- This is a purposive construction.
- MCA s.15 states, ‘An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests,’ and so the advocate must convince the Court that the Order sought is in P’s best interests.
- MCA s.4 sets out how bests interests are to be determined.
- Capacity must be proven on the balance of probabilities (MCA s.24).
- In other words, having decided what the facts are, and having applied the law to those facts, the Judge must decide whether on balance P is more likely to have capacity, or more likely to lack capacity to do something.
- The distinguishing characteristic of the COP is that the processes of the court are essentially inquisitorial rather than adversarial.
- In other words, the ambit of the litigation is not determined not by the parties, but by the Court.
- The function of the Court is not to determine in a disinterested way, a dispute brought to it by the parties, but rather, to engage in a process of assessing whether an adult is lacking in capacity, and if so, making decisions about his welfare that are in his best interests.
- In contrast to the adversarial method, which aims to get at the truth by two competing parties arguing their case, and the Judge arriving at a conclusion in favour of the probability of one version of events in preference to another, the aim of the inquisitorial method, is to get at the truth through extensive investigation and examination of all of the evidence.
- This requires a more collaborative approach.
- In particular, legal representatives are required to help the Court to further the overriding objective by amongst other things, addressing whether the case can be resolved swiftly.
- The zone of influence is the space in which the Judge can move to decide what is in P’s best interest;
- Unlike a rule that can be analyzed as a conditional statement of the form, i.e. if athen b, the legislator has left it to the Judge to decide what is in P’s best interest on the facts.
- To persuade the Judge to rule in favour of your client you must consider the discretionary space in which the Judge can move to decide what is in P’s best interest.
- That is the zone of influence counsel needs to enter and navigate in order to win.
- Because P’s best interests are paramount, in exploring the space, the court will also seek to ascertain what P’s actual or likely wishes, views and preferences are.
- There is a trap door inside the zone of influence through which an unwary advocate may fall, because when looking at P through the eyes of a COP Judge an advocate must not conflate a capacity assessment with a best interest analysis.
- The assessment of whether P has capacity, and if not, what is in P’s best interests, are distinct issues and must be approached in a manner that is detached and objective.
- Advocates and experts must ensure that they specifically address the issue of capacity within the framework of the MCA.
- An analysis of the s.3 test will always be necessary.
- However, experts must be careful not to set the bar too high, nor to add elements into the test that are unsupported by statute or relevant jurisprudential tests.
- Medical practitioners assessing capacity would normally seek to take into account all aspects of the personality and behavior of the person, including vulnerability to exploitation.
- However, vulnerability to exploitation must not of itself lead to the conclusion that there is a lack of capacity.
- The court must ultimately decide whether P has capacity and if not, what would be in P’s best interests.
- Whilst an absence of medical evidence must not be a bar to a court finding lack of capacity, where medical evidence cannot be obtained, the court should be particularly cautious before concluding that there has been a disturbance of the mind.
- Where medical matters are concerned, the court must have regard to the unanimous expert advice.
- In particular, the evidence of the burdens of this kind of treatment must carry heavy weight.
- Even so, that evidence is bound to be based on an assessment of probability, and there will be a very small number of cases where the improbable occurs.
- Moreover the assessment of best interests of course encompasses factors of all kinds, and not medical factors alone, and reaches into areas where doctors are not experts.
Undoubtedly, some disputes require a bargaining approach and some require a problem-solving approach. Mediators with sensitivity will deal with each according to its needs. And many may involve a mixture of both approaches … although negotiation can be conducted in such a way as to create joint gains for both parties, an essential tension in negotiation exists between co-operation moves to create value and competitive moves to claim it. Brown & Marriott (2018)
An application to the COP can include a request for an order that the parties attend mediation. In furtherance on the overriding objective (Rule 1.1), the court is expected to encourage the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure where appropriate, and once proceedings are issued, the court can consider whether all or any of the issues subject to application are suitable to be referred to mediation. When is mediation appropriate?
The issues covered in case studies mediated ranged from residence (most frequently cited, with 59% of cases involving residence) to medical treatment and statutory wills (each raised in 7.4% of cases). Almost one-third of cases involved finance and property. Other issues in the cases mediated included Power of Attorney, Deputyship, holidays, and Deprivation of Liberty…The success rate in the reported cases was high, with 78% of reported cases reaching an agreement either during or following mediation. Written agreement was reached in 52% of cases, with a further 19% achieving written agreement following the mediation. Oral rather than written agreement was reached in 7% of cases. In 22% of cases there was no agreement. In most of those where an agreement was reached (59%), the terms of agreement were incorporated into a court order. Reasons for lack of agreement being reached included entrenched positions, too many parties and too little time, and the existence of allegations of financial abuse and fraud. Examples given of approximate cost savings were between £6,000 and £30,000 – the exact savings depended on length of case and when in the proceedings the mediation took place, as well as estimates of savings of judicial and court staff time, and time of counsel and local authority professionals.
(Mediating Court of Protection cases – Summary of research’ by Charlotte May: https://ukaji.org/2017/05/03/mediating-court-of-protection-cases-summary-of-research/)
For those who have proposed mediation or responded to a suggestion by the court or another party, it is essential to consider what to expect from the mediation. Advisers will need to have a clear grasp of the strengths and weaknesses of the client’s case. Perhaps for this reason, many Court of Protection mediations take place after the receipt of experts’ reports … This is an ideal time to take stock of the evidence as it now stands, in as objective a way as possible…In anticipation of the mediation the following issues should be considered:
Assuming that new evidence (especially in the form of expert reports) has been received, what if any impact has this evidence had on the views and positions of the parties?
Advisers should explore with their clients as neutrally as possible whether there are any concessions which the client feels they could offer which might promote an agreement.
These might include matters that could not be achieved through litigation alone…
It is important to evaluate in the light of the evidence what the client can realistically achieve in the litigation. If mediation fails what is the likely outcome of a contested hearing? Is there any reason (on an objective evaluation) to believe that any of the other parties have not agreed to mediate in good faith?
The potential benefits of mediation should be weighed, even if it is unlikely to deliver a full resolution: might it narrow the issues or at least improve the parties’ ability to communicate? With this point in mind advisers are encouraged to manage their client’s expectations…
Court of Protection cases pose particular challenges. P’s interests need to remain central to the process. If P is a party, he or she is likely to have a litigation friend who is likely to be present (or be represented) at the mediation. The litigation friend should make every attempt to ascertain P’s wishes and feelings on the issues which are being mediated. By definition, P is unlikely to be able to take part in the process of compromise and give-and-take that may be involved in mediation. It is the mediator’s role to ensure that P remains the focus of the mediation and to reduce the time spent disproportionately on satellite issues which may be considered important by the other parties. The second difficulty is that Court of Protection cases will frequently involve an imbalance of power between the parties, as they may typically involve a dispute between a statutory body and one or more individuals. It is suggested that this requires the mediator to satisfy him or herself that even though one party may be in a much stronger position, that party remains willing genuinely to consider an element of compromise.
(Ruck Keene (2018), paragraphs 19.33 to 19.4).
‘BME’ stands for ‘beginning’, ‘middle’, and ‘end’. The steps in the procedure are:
- Commercial analysis – joint evaluation of:
• estate/trust assets;
• opportunities (i.e. commercial exploitation of hidden value, e.g. IPR rights in relation to a work of art);
• risks (e.g. the IHT/CGT consequences of a DOV executed after the s.142 IHTA 1984 window has closed, or the actual impact of BREXIT on the property market, e.g. if in the surrounding locality for valuation, a business fails or moves abroad, resulting in: (i) unemployment; (ii) a surge in mortgage default; and (iii) an increase in the volume of comparable properties being sold ‘cheap’ at auction, placing downward pressure on the market);
- Legal risk analysis – separate evaluation of the:
• facts (i.e. a chronology);
• remedies & procedure; and
(1) needs/preferences e.g. retention of land to run a farm as a viable going concern versus assets available for sale to generate liquidity (and their saleability / current market value based upon condition/status quo);
(2) opportunities e.g. planning permission to release/exploit hidden or trapped value or tax e.g. the RNRB for deaths after 6 April 2017;
(3) choices – if e.g. party ‘A’ is willing to settle for asset ‘X’ and party ‘B’ for asset ‘Y’, evaluating the difference in value arising from the asymmetry between:
• the value of each party’s respective claims on the estate/trust assets as a whole i.e. X + Y); and
• the individual market values of ‘X ‘and ‘ Y’; and
• the cost of extracting value from ‘X’ and ‘Y’, e.g. if a property requires renovation before it can be sold, which when calculated may illustrate that the difference between the value at which ‘A’ and ‘B’ will settle (the ‘Zone of Difference’) is in fact less than 5%. In other words, that a symmetrical BATNA would = settlement at the mid-point of 2.5% (if actually doable, i.e. practicable);
(4) adjustments to be factored into the settlement equation, i.e. which can reduce the Zone of Difference (‘Z’) to zero; and
(5) arithmetical comparison of Z (as a crunched number) with the potential costs of litigation (‘C’) on:
• the standard basis if a party wins i.e. because that party would usually fail to recover around 1/3 of their actual costs (which e.g. in a trial costing around £150K each = a loss of £50K);
• liability for own costs and other party’s costs (on standard basis if a party loses) (e.g. £250-£300K); and
• chances of success (which at the early stage of any proceedings, i.e. before disclosure has taken place and witness statements have been exchanged is difficult to forecast with any accuracy, hence a conservative estimate is unlikely to be greater than 60/70% on either side = a difference of 30:35.
Agreeing a fair and sensible split of estate/trust assets (i.e. X + Y) that avoids the ongoing and increasingly large risk of C either: (i) exhausting the available value (including hidden value) of X and Y, or (ii) the risk of either or both A and B, ending up in negative equity. This requires pragmatism because in the long term ‘less can mean more’ if litigation is avoided/discontinued.
In relation to COP proceedings:
• X & Y = P;
• the value of P = costs of implementing a ‘best interests’ decision (‘BID’);
• based upon expert evidence about P’s capacity; assessments and reports provided by a local authority about P’s needs and the available options, and resulting costs (‘RC’), the COP can endorse a BID agreed in mediation between e.g. two warring local authorities (‘LA’s’) about how RC is to be funded (‘F’);
• in agreeing F, the LA’s can address adjustments e.g. to take account of voluntary payments already made by one LA (‘LA1’) toward P’s residential care costs following a move by P to the administrative area of the other LA (‘LA2’), which LA2 can compare to the future costs of litigation (including possibly a referral to the Secretary of State and where a convention right is engaged and the claim qualifies, proceedings in the ECHR).
The point being that in mediation:
• LA1 and LA2 can at the ‘beginning’ agree upon what is in P’s best interests based upon expert evidence;
• in the ‘middle’ they can then work collaboratively to identify the practical options available and costs involved; and
• at the ‘end’ can jointly develop a plan (including transition), to implement a BID for P that can be approved by the COP judge.
That should result in a win/win outcome all round because:
• P’s best interests will have been met;
• LA1 and LA2 will have spent their precious resources on developing a plan for implementation, instead of on legal fees;
• the plan can be implemented by the COP (who do not have jurisdiction to decide public law issues and therefore cannot order a LA to pay for P’s ongoing/future care); and
• LA1 will exit on terms that are satisfactory to LA2.
The acme of the advocate and the expert in the COP is therefore to work collaboratively in P’s best interests with the aim of the parties agreeing a BID for approval by the court that is possibly better for both P and each LA, instead of pursuing an aggressive litigation strategy with a win/lose binary outcome at court. From the outset of a mediation the mediation advocate could say to the other counsel,
‘Thank you for meeting with us today.
I will be corrected if I am wrong, but what I think you say about the facts and the law is…It is not my job to persuade you that your arguments will not succeed at trial.
As you know we say that we will succeed.
I am not interested in having an argument with you about whose view is right.
I suggest that litigation is not going to be a great outcome for either you or my client. The risks are…
I am here because I believe that we can reach a principled and fair deal that is not only good for my client but also better for you.
I hope that you will work with me to achieve this today’.
Each issue in dispute can then be approached constructively:
• from the point of view of needs, interests (with P’s ‘best interests’ taking priority), and options, rather than fault and blame; and
• by focusing on the best possible outcome for all of the parties.
Both sides can then work to maintain an open and reasonable atmosphere, with the mediation advocates emphasizing objectivity, resulting in a potential settlement being judged against agreed criteria to test fairness.
Because the ‘beginning’ requires preliminary groundwork by each party, in preparing: (i) a commercial analysis; and (ii) a legal risk analysis, to be provided privately to the mediator ahead of the mediation, i.e. as a ‘road-map’ to educate him about the issues, facts, law, and dynamics underlying resolution of the claim, there is no need for a plenary session, other than to discuss ‘house-keeping’ matters. In other words, instead of exchanging partisan position papers, and wasting precious daylight engaged in posturing and positional argument about who is ‘right’ and who is ‘wrong’, resulting in tempers being inflamed, and the further entrenchment of positions, resulting in ‘road-blocks’ that prevent the making of a deal before 5pm, the parties can set the mediator free to work his magic, and get on with the business of ‘doing a deal’. They can then start to engage constructively with each other in a joint-problem solving exercise, conducted by ‘proxy’, through the mediator. If progress has been made in agreeing principles but the detail and conditions of the deal remain to be agreed, perhaps because an issue has emerged which requires further investigation and proper evaluation so that a sensible and informed commercial decision can be made about allocation/sharing of risk, then the parties can resume their discussion through emails and if necessary a round-table negotiation, which does not require further involvement by the mediator. Terms of settlement can then be agreed and documented in order to implement a practical and efficient plan of action in the best interests of P.
Baker, The Hon Mr Justice et al (2018). Court of Protection Practice 2018. LexisNexis, Jordan Publishing.
Keehan, Mr Justice, Claire Wills-Goldingham, Marie Leslie, and Paul Divall (2016). Court of Protection Made Clear. Bath Publishing.
Ruck Keene, Alex (2014). Acting as a litigation friend in the Court of Protection, http://www.39essex.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Acting-as-a-Litigation-Friend-in-theCourt-of-Protection-October-2014.pdf.
Ruck Keene, Alex, Kate Edwards, Anselm Eldergill and Sophy Miles (2018). Court of Protection Handbook, a user’s guide. 2nd edition revised, Legal Action Group.
Shipman, Shirley A, Benjamin D. Waters, and William Wood (2018). Brown & Marriott’s ADR Principles and Practice. 4th edition, Sweet and Maxwell.
Sime, Stuart and Derek French (2018). Blackstone’s Civil Practice 2018. Oxford University Press.
Walker, Stephen (2018). Mediation Advocacy. Bloomsbury Professional.
- Court of Protection: www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/court-of-protectionMental Capacity Act 2005: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents
- Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice and Guidance:www.gov.uk/government/publications/mental-capacity-act-code-of-practice
- Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/18/contents/enacted
- Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS): www.scie.org.uk/mca/dols/practice/lps
- Latest developments and recent cases – 39 Essex Chambers: www.39essex.com/practice-area/court-of-protection-barristers/