Commercial Mediation of Music & Performers’ Rights Disputes

As a CMC Registered Mediator (Mediator Search — Civil Mediation) I am developing Commercial Mediation as a niche practice area.

See:

Commercial Mediation of Music Disputes — Civil Mediation

‘Commercial Mediation of Music Disputes.’ Published in the Law Society Gazette 01.12.2023: Commercial mediation of music disputes | Law Gazette

Golden rule in commercial mediation.’ Published online in the Law Society Gazette, 13.05.2024: Golden rule in commercial mediation | Law Gazette

To appoint me as a Commercial Mediator, please contact my Clerk at 1 EC Barristers.

1 EC Barristers, 3 Kings Bench Walk North, Temple, London EC4Y 7HR.

(www.1ec.co.uk)

Tel: 020 7936 3030 or 020 7832 1010.

Tel out of hours: 07721 866 858.

Email: clerks@1ec.co.uk

See:

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Before contacting my Clerk to enquire about appointing me, please email him a brief summary about the following:

  • What is the dispute about?
  • What is the value of the dispute and what assets are involved?
  • Who are the parties and if legally represented who are their lawyers?
  • Where are the parties and their lawyers located?
  • Have all parties involved agreed to Mediation?
  • How will the Mediation take place – i.e. by Zoom or face to face?
  • What is the time frame for starting and conducting the Mediation?

Please note:

  • I only undertake cases where the amount in dispute is below £2.5 million.
  • Mediators do not provide commercial, legal, or tax advice, and do not draft settlement agreements.
  • I charge on a fixed fee basis, payable in advance to my Chambers Bank Account, and have a standard Mediation Agreement, which sets out the ground-rules for the Mediation, which must be signed by all parties and anybody else who attends the Mediation.
  • With the exception of pre-mediation day Zoom calls, all Mediation days by Zoom will be conducted by me in Chambers at 1 EC Barristers in London between 10am to 5.30pm. See also: SOM Guide to Remote Mediation 2024.pdf (wildapricot.org)

MEDIATION OF MUSIC & PERFORMERS’ RIGHTS DISPUTES 

Carl Islam [Working Revised Draft 15.01.2026] – Please note that this Practice Note is an incomplete work in progress.

Contents

  • Introduction.
  • Litigation risk.
  • Mediation.
  • Benefits.
  • Timing – The Balance of Convenience in Commercial Mediation.
  • ‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediator Mindset in a Creative Dispute.
  • Nash Equilibrium.
  • Deal Making Zone.
  • Table.
  • Enforcement under the Singapore Convention.
  • Mandatory Mediation.
  • Business Arrangements & Contractual Matrix.
  • Fiduciary Duties owed by Managers & their Companies to Artists.
  • Copyright.
  • Fair dealing & exceptions.
  • Sampling.
  • Songwriter splits & shares.
  • Trademark.
  • Ownership of goodwill in a Band’s name.
  • Performing rights.
  • Moral Rights.
  • Image rights.
  • Breach of confidence.
  • Duress.
  • Undue Influence.
  • Unconscionable Dealing.
  • Restraint of trade.
  • Mediator Questions.
  • Bibliography.
  • Cases.

Introduction

In order to be effective, a Mediator requires a deep understanding of the industry’s unique blend of creative, commercial, and interpersonal issues.

This includes specific knowledge of industry norms, complex contracts, and the significant role of personal relationships and reputation.

Disputes in the Music Industry are often not just about money; they involve creative identity, artistic integrity, and control. Mediators must understand how to ‘recast’ creative disagreements (e.g., artistic direction, song selection, credit allocation) in commercial terms to facilitate a resolution.

Songwriter ‘split’ disputes, for example, involve allocating both compositional credit and earnings.

An effective mediator should be fluent in the music business’s specific legal and financial frameworks, including:

(i) Royalty calculation and distribution – How earnings from sales, streaming, and performances are calculated, and common issues like claims of underpayment or misuse of deductibles.

(ii) Contract types – Nuances of recording, publishing, management, and booking agency contracts.

(iii) Guild and union frameworks – Knowledge of relevant arbitration frameworks and requirements from industry bodies.

(iv) Copyright and image rights – The legal principles surrounding copyright infringement, moral rights, and the use of an artist’s name and image (‘Personality rights’).

The music world often involves strong personalities and egos, and conflicts can quickly become personal.

A mediator must manage these dynamics with empathy and objectivity, focusing on behaviour and issues rather than personalities.

Working relationships in the industry are interdependent, and adversarial court proceedings often fracture future opportunities.

Mediation is uniquely suited to preserving these relationships, and the mediator should work to salvage future collaboration prospects.

Disputes can attract negative publicity that harms an artist’s public image and career. Mediators should be mindful of PR implications and help parties prioritize confidentiality.

The industry operates on strict timelines related to production schedules, album releases, and touring. Mediators must leverage these deadlines as pressure points to generate settlement momentum and ensure business continuity.

Unlike a court that is constrained by the available legal remedies, mediation allows for imaginative, commercially beneficial solutions tailored to the parties’ unique needs, such as shared credits, revised delivery schedules, or unique co-marketing opportunities.

The mediator must be a creative problem solver to explore these possibilities.

Litigation risk

There is always an unquantifiable element of risk in litigation. It is also rare, even during or at the end of a trial, to have evidential certainty and all the information a party wanted available. Parties develop their cases as they fight them in court, and so the ‘goal posts’ can move. A judge can decide a case on grounds that have not even been pleaded. Following a trial the winner will not usually recover all of their costs, and the loser may end up in negative equity.

Music disputes are pregnant with litigation risk because they are multifaceted, legally complex, often multi-party[i], and can be multi-jurisdictional. A case theory may hinge upon persuading a judge, on the facts, that an evolving doctrine of law avails the claimant of a remedy. Equitable remedies are discretionary. Consequently, there may be a high degree of uncertainty about legal merits and chances of success.

The range of claims is illustrated in the Table below under the heading – ‘Deal Making Zone’, and include:

  • Band splits/departure of a member.
  • Breach of confidence.
  • Breach of Contract e.g. of a Booking Agency Contract, Management Contract, Music Publishing Contract, or Recording Contract.
  • Breach of fiduciary duty under a Management Contract – which is linked to claims for equitable compensation, rescission, and contract vitiation on the grounds of Undue Influence and the doctrine of Restraint of Trade.
  • Image rights (also known as ‘personality rights’ or ‘publicity rights’) i.e. an artist’s proprietary rights in their personality, which is linked to branding and endorsement. In England and Wales these rights are not codified. Unauthorised use of a person’s name and image is litigated by claiming for breach of contract; infringement of a Trade Mark; passing off; defamation and malicious falsehood; breach of confidence; breach of advertising rules; or breach of privacy.
  • Infringement of copyright, plagiarism[ii] and sampling without consent.
  • Violation of Moral Rights.
  • Passing Off.
  • Royalties – Calculation and deductibles.
  • Share of royalties – Claims by session musicians.
  • Songwriter split disputes.
  • Trade Mark infringement – e.g. the Band’s name, which is linked to ownership of ‘goodwill’ in the name.

‘It is now common that contracts regulating the exploitation of rights are drafted in the form of 360-degree agreements, which cover all aspects of valuable assets related to the creativity and image of a musician, such as sound recordings, musical compositions, image rights, merchandising and live performance work. This presents a challenge for musicians who are not supported by large legal teams, because they face not one, but potentially multiple legal regimes, coupled with the complexities of commercialisation over the Internet (mainly jurisdictional issues).’ [‘Mediation and arbitration – An alternative forum for transnational dispute resolution in the music industries’, by Metka Potočnik, Chapter 6, page 127 of ‘The Present and Future of Music Law’, edited by Ann Harrison and Tony Rigg (2023), Bloomsbury] (‘Potočnik’).

Spiralling costs in litigation create a power imbalance between an artist and record company. Likewise in Arbitration, the ‘evidence taking procedure, although flexible and left to the agreement of the parties, will often be expensive, unless the parties agree on restricted evidentiary procedure from the start.’ (‘Potočnik’, page 142).[iii]

Mediation

Unless either: the relationship between the Participants in Mediation [‘P’s’] has irretrievably broken down; the will does not exist to collaborate; or it is not practical/appropriate ‘to do a deal’, then as in the words of the late and great George Michael, Mediation can not only – ‘Heal the pain’, it can also liberate the P’s, by enabling them to work out a creative deal to their mutual advantage. This can be achieved by maximising joint-gains in a way that furthers each P’s individual interests. For all P’s this requires a ‘paradigm shift’, whereby they each decide to apply their talents to a creative endeavour, instead of engaging in litigation – thereby avoiding the costs, risks, stress and publicity of going to war. In Mediation the P’s can agree a commercial framework for settling a dispute on terms that a court has no power and jurisdiction to order[iv]. In other words, commercial Mediation is an opportunity to make/renegotiate ‘a deal’ about the creation, acquisition, adaption, and use of rights, for commercial exploitation, thereby freeing each P to get on with what they enjoy most, and do best as either  creatives, entrepreneurs, or business executives.

Although life can only be understood backwards, it must be lived forwards. Litigation is a backwards looking process, at the end of which a Judge must make a binary choice between competing narratives. Mediation is a forward-looking process in which the participants work out their own solution through a process of engagement. Therefore, the first challenge for a Mediator (‘M’) is to understand what each P wants, needs, prioritizes, and why. This requires empathy and affirmation. The second is to facilitate engagement. As discussed in Part 1 of my article on the ‘Publications’ page about Mediating Probate & Trust Disputes – the ‘hook’ is the making of an ‘interesting offer’. On paper, a theoretical settlement zone exists somewhere in the gap between:

(i)       the maximum net capital value of each P’s claim; and

(ii)      each P’s BATNA (‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’) – which in litigation is proceeding to trial, i.e. the amount/terms below which a P will walk away from the table. The challenge in reducing the size of the gap is to make adjustments. In other words, throughout the ‘Mediation Process’, each P needs to re-evaluate the calculus underlying their BATNA. A Mediation ‘process’ may involve more than one day of meetings, e.g. where an international commercial dispute involves P’s located in different time zones. Whether the ‘process’ is conducted over the course of one day or several days, a well-constructed Mediation typically involves seven phases:

  • Preparation.
  • Exploration.
  • Exchange of further information.
  • Formulation of proposals.
  • Negotiation.
  • Adjustments to narrow the gap.
  • Agreement of terms in principle followed by the drafting and execution of a binding Settlement Agreement.

Benefits

In my experience and opinion, the cut and thrust world of commercial litigation has very little to do with abstract notions of justice, and is actually more about perceptions and calculation. So, unless a party needs a court determination to move forward, then why not do a deal instead? In my experience, there is nearly always a deal to be done.

Paradoxically, while a claimant may have gone to court or threatened to issue proceedings because they are being ignored or stonewalled, the voices in the court room are not those of the parties, but of lawyers and judges who have no actual ‘skin in the game.’ Consequently, how participants speak to each other in a Mediation, either directly, or through their legal representatives or the Mediator, is an opportunity to show respect by allowing the other to be heard. That can move the parties along from deadlock about their respective positions to doing a deal in their mutual interests. The skill of allowing a participant in Mediation their voice, i.e., the right to be heard, is linked to both ‘how you talk’ and to ’empathetic listening’, because to switch the dynamic from confrontation to collaboration, you must first show a person that:

(i)     he/she has been heard; and

(ii)     you understand his/her position, and the underlying reasons.

See also:

Timing – The Balance of Convenience in Commercial Mediation’

In voluntary Commercial Mediation, the ‘Balance of Convenience’ is a practical, commercial, and, at times, strategic consideration used to determine the timing, format, and structure of the Mediation to ensure that it is effective for both Participants.

It involves assessing the logistical and economic advantages of conducting Mediation against the potential disruption to business, i.e. it is about how to make the Mediation process as efficient, accessible, and least disruptive as possible to the Participants’ business operations.

A balance must be struck between early Mediation (which saves costs but may lack sufficient information), and later Mediation (when Participants may have become entrenched and costs have already escalated).

Mediation offers the convenience of scheduling at a mutually convenient time and place, often using separate, private rooms for each party and a central room for joint sessions.

The process is designed to be a ‘long day’ (often 8-14 hours) to maximize the chance of settlement, weighing the costs of the mediation itself against the far greater expense and risk of litigation.

To minimize disruption, Mediations are often held at a neutral venue or the offices of one of the Participants’ solicitors.

The freedom to agree the scheduling of Mediation, is of course a benefit of Mediation over Litigation, because a judge may impose a rigid Trial Timetable that is not convenient, i.e. which causes disruption to the business operations of one or more of the Participants.

‘Deal Making’ Commercial Mediator Mindset in a Creative Dispute

By its nature, a creative dispute lends itself to a creative solution – assuming that is what each Participant in Mediation wants to achieve by participating in the Mediation Process.

There is a tension between competing motivations.

The participants may each be seeking a pragmatic commercial solution, i.e. based upon optimising ‘Shared Interests’.

However, their legal representatives may be focusing on financial compensation, which of course includes expenses and incurred costs, i.e. based upon maximising ‘Positions’.

So, a challenge for the Mediator is to manage this tension without exacerbating it.

The following is a Checklist of issues to explore in Preliminary Private Sessions with each Participant and their legal representatives, in order to steer the dialogue away from ‘legal rights’ and power’, and toward ‘interests’, thereby opening the door to the discovery by the Participants for themselves, of practical options for the structuring of pragmatic commercial terms of settlement, that ‘square the circle’ in a way that works for both of them:

·       Participants, i.e. the ‘People’ who have ‘skin in the game’ – What motivates each of them? – What is important to them: ‘needs’ and ‘priorities’.
·       What is the ‘Problem’?
·       Why?
·       What is at stake? – i.e. money, reputation and relationships, including with the public, i.e. consumers and audiences.
·       Reality Testing – Potential litigation risks, costs and adverse publicity [‘LRC’].
·       Pragmatic Commercial Solution [‘PCS’] – With some imagination, can the Problem be fixed, i.e. ‘sorted’?
·       How?
·       At what cost i.e. the ‘What is the Price of Doing a Deal in Mediation’ [‘PDM’].
·       PDM minus LRC = ?, so is doing a Deal today in Mediation by putting a ‘Price’ on it, better for you than going to Trial? i.e. does a ‘Golden Commercial Bridge’ exist in Mediation, that a Judge cannot impose?
·       ‘Creative’ brainstorming/commercial problem solving.
·       Making an ‘Interesting Offer’ i.e. to hook the other Participant, so that negotiations can begin based upon ‘Interests’ instead of ‘Positions.’
·       Enable Participants to discover and develop a PCS by and for themselves.

Nash Equilibrium

In Mediation Theory, the ‘Nash Equilibrium’ is the stable point at which each Participant’s [‘P’s] chosen strategy (i.e. ‘offer’/’concession’) is the best
response to the other’s, i.e. the point at which neither P can improve
their commercial outcome by ‘unilaterally’ making a change in strategy.

So, in ‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediation, the ‘Nash Equilibrium’ is the point at which proposed terms of settlement are ‘enough’, i.e. are ‘sufficient’, to satisfy the underlying needs and priorities of each P.

In other words, the Nash Equilibrium’ = the ‘Price’ to each P of ‘Doing a Deal’ in Commercial Mediation v. potentially costs/risks of Commercial Litigation.

In Commercial Mediation, each P will aim to maximize their own gain, and assume that the other P will do the same. Since the actions of one P directly affect the outcome of the other, this creates a strategic dynamic.

The ‘Nash Equilibrium’ is reached when Participant A’s offer is the best response to Participant B’s offer, and vice versa, i.e. because as rational actors, theoretically neither P will want to move from the commercial ‘Sweet Spot’.

Unlike litigation, ‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediation seeks mutual gains.

Therefore, the ‘Equilibrium’ does not involve just just ‘splitting losses’, which is a ‘zero-sum game’, but instead finding the ‘point’ at which both P’s can obtain a better overall outcome when compared to the costs/risks of litigation, which is a ‘non-zero-sum game’.

To facilitate the exploration of where a commercial ‘Sweet-Spot’ may exist, a
‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediator can guide, i.e. ‘steer’ the P’s towards the
point of ‘Equilibrium’, i.e. where the P’s ‘offers’ and ‘counter-offers’
converge on a mutually acceptable agreement.

This point of ‘convergence’ is known as the ‘Nash Bargaining Solution’.

‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediators manage information flow, in order to help the P’s see the ‘big picture’, encouraging rational moves towards the ‘Equilibrium’ rather than sticking to entrenched positions.

While a true ‘Nash Equilibrium’ is stable, a ‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediator must ensure that the ‘outcome’ is not forced upon a P by any ‘power imbalance’.

So, a skilled ‘Deal-Making’ Commercial Mediator will help the P’s to see that
‘collaborative equilibrium’ is better than the costs and risks of litigation –
i.e. to discover for themselves, what I describe in my book, the 2nd Edition of the ‘Contentious Probate Handbook’ (published by the Law Society in 2025) as a – potential ‘Deal-Making Zone’ (‘DMZ’).

Deal Making Zone (‘DMZ’)

Parking emotions, greed, ambition, and politics, and irrespective of the fact specific legal merits of a dispute, as the table below illustrates, the settlement of a Music Dispute invariably involves a trade-off  between twelve inter-connected variables along a spectrum of needs, resources, priorities, and ‘Red-line’ dealmaker/breaker imperatives, i.e. each P’s BATNA. The DMZ exists in the space between two interacting parallel dynamics which may converge in the consciousness of each P:

Relative Gains v. Relative Losses [‘P.1 – P.2’].

Common Ground [‘CG’].

Relative Gains v. Relative Losses:

(i)         Legal rights.

(ii)        Creative control[v].

(iii)       Money.

(iv)       Recognition, Reputation/ & Credibility.

Common ground in eliminating litigation risk by doing a deal instead of proceeding to trial includes:

(v)        Saving costs.

(vi)       Saving time.

(vii)      Saving energy.

(viii)     Avoiding further stress and anxiety.

(ix)       Avoiding publicity.

(x)        Avoiding the creation of a legal precedent.

(xi)       Preserving a commercial relationship and goodwill if worth saving.

(xii)      Maximising gain by transforming a conflict into a mutually beneficial commercial arrangement (a ‘Creative Commercial Opportunity’).

I posit that the gap between P1. and P.2 is reduced by the convergence of CG with P.1 – P.2. In other words, the closer P.1 – P.2 is to the underlying CG, the smaller the gap is between P.1 and P.2. That is the DMZ. Visually this can be represented as follows:

Pre- Convergence

P.1 ————————————————————————————–P.2

                                               

 CG?

 

Convergence

P.1 ————-P.2

          CG

In contrast to Litigation, in Mediation the possibilities are only limited by the imagination of the participants and their legal representatives. Whilst not infinite, ‘doable’ deals that ‘are enough’ are invariably possible.

Table

Please note that C = ‘Claimant’.

Claim Dispute Case
Band split. Bourne.[vi]
Breach of confidence. Ash.[vii]

[‘A judge had been correct to prevent the further publication of parts of a book, written and published by the former friend of a well-known recording artist, which contained confidential information about the artist’s personal life that infringed her rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 Sch.1 Part I Art.8 , and those rights were not outweighed by the publisher’s right to freedom of expression under Art.10 of the Act.’ – Westlaw – WL.360995].

 

 

Associated Newspapers.[viii]

[‘(1) There were no unresolved issues of fact that called for a trial. (2) The information in the journal was obviously both confidential and of a private nature, Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No.6) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] Q.B. 125, [2005] 5 WLUK 429 applied. (3) W had a reasonable expectation that the content of the journal would remain private, Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, [2004] 5 WLUK 97 applied. The employees to whom copies were circulated were all under a contractual duty of confidence and others who received copies had always treated them as confidential. (4) It was significant in the instant case that the contents of the journal had been disclosed in breach of confidence. The test to be applied when considering whether it was necessary to restrict freedom of expression in order to prevent disclosure of information received in confidence was not simply whether the information was a matter of public interest but whether in all the circumstances it was in the public interest that the duty of confidence should be breached. In applying the test of proportionality the nature of the relationship that gave rise to the duty of confidentiality might be important, Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EWCA Civ 1374, [2003] I.C.R. 141, [2002] 10 WLUK 340 considered. The information at issue in the instant case was private information, public disclosure of which constituted an interference with W’s rights under Sch.1 Part I Art.8 of the 1998 Act. There was an important public interest in employees respecting the obligations of confidence that they had assumed. The public interest in disclosure of the journal’s contents did not outweigh the confidential nature of the information and the relationship of confidence under which it had been received. The significance of the interference with Art.8 rights outweighed the prospective interference with Art.10 rights that would have been involved in preventing N from publishing the information. Even in the absence of a breach of confidence W would have had an unanswerable claim for breach of privacy. (5) The judge had been right to conclude that N’s publication of the information did not in the circumstances constitute fair dealing for the purposes of reporting current events under s.30(2) of the 1988 Act. Nor did N have any defence of fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review under s.30(1) of the 1988 Act’] (Westlaw – WL – 3610056 – 2006].

Blog.
Campbell.
Coe.[ix]
Cox.
Sussex.[x]

[‘The Court of Appeal upheld summary judgments in favour of HRH the Duchess of Sussex in respect of her claims for misuse of private information and copyright infringement after a newspaper group published articles reproducing extensive extracts from a letter she had written to her estranged father. New evidence which had been widely publicised in the press was admitted as a matter of pragmatism. The newspaper group seeking to set aside the judgments had failed to overturn the conclusion that the primary purpose of its articles was to reveal the full content of the letter and not to rebut inaccuracies in an earlier article published in a US magazine.’ – Westlaw – WL 05647562 (2021)].

Jagger.
Mosley.
Injunction granted. Oasis..
Douglas.
Footballer.
Re S.
Theakston.
Breach of contract. Booking agency agreement. Craig Joseph.[xi]

[‘The members of a musical act were successful in their defamation claim against a promoter and entertainment booking company in relation to a posting on the company’s website stating that the act might not honour bookings to perform, but were only awarded nominal damages as one of the members had attempted to deceive the court by fabricating part of the claim for special damages.’ – Westlaw 8866996 – 2012].

 

Gary Marlow.[xii]
Breach of fiduciary duty.

See also:

–      Restraint of Trade &

–      Undue Influence.

Management Contract:

 

 

 

 

Cardi B – Settled:

–      $10 million claim v. artist for breach of contract, unjust enrichment & defamation.

–      Claim against artist’s new manager for knowingly interfering with her contract.

–      Counterclaim by artists for recovery of recording royalties received by her manager who had been ’self-serving and controlling’.

Chance RapperChance the Rapper Sues Ex-Manager Who Sued Him for Millions | Pitchfork
Elton John:

– Contract vitiated – FD owed both by Manager & Companies under his control.

[‘The action concerned a series of publishing, recording and management agreements, entered into by E.J. and his lyricist, B.T., beginning in 1967, when they were unknown and still minors. The agreements were extended and varied from time to time. From 1971, Ds began to set up a network of wholly-owned subsidiaries in the most lucrative world markets in order to sub-publish Ps’ works there and they received substantial rates of commission which, together with the expense of maintaining offices and employing staff, substantially reduced the net earnings of D2, and thus Ps’ share of the gross revenues from their work. Ps’ primary claims were for the setting aside, on the ground of undue influence, of the publishing and recording agreements, the return of the copyrights in all compositions and recordings covered by the agreements and delivery-up of all master recordings. Ps conceded that the Ds should retain all sums received by them so far, save that they should account for (a) all sums wrongly retained by them by way of the sub-publishing agreements and (b) the difference between the royalty rates in the agreements being set aside and the best possible rates obtainable in the market.’ Westlaw – WL – 311792 (1985)].[xiii]

Robbie Williams:

–      C claimed unpaid commission.

–      No breach of FD.

–      Manager had acted in good faith.

Trent – Fraud, Conversion & Breach of FD by Manager.
Commission. Management contract. Wadlow.[xiv]

[‘On its proper construction, a management agreement entitled a manager of an artist to commission on the artist’s earnings in relation to two music albums, both during the term of the agreement and after its termination.’ – Westlaw – WL 555756 (2007)].

 

Copyright. Contributory liability for infringement of ISP who had specific knowledge of copyright infringement by subscribers on its networks. Sony.
Injunction. Gabrielle.[xv]

 

SABAM.
Shape Of you.

[The court granted a declaration that the claimants’ popular and successful song, “Shape of You”, had not infringed copyright in the defendants’ song, “Oh Why”. Whilst there were similarities between elements of the two songs, there were also differences, and the similarities were readily explained by matters other than copying. The court rejected the defendants’ allegations that the first claimant, songwriter and recording artist Ed Sheeran, had a propensity to copy the musical works of others, or that he had deliberately or unconsciously copied elements of Oh Why in creating Shape of You]. (Westlaw – WL. 01017818 (2022)).[xvi]

 

 

Laches. Fisher:
Plagiarism. Amazing.
Francis Day.[xvii]
Gray.
Shape of you.
Skidmore.
Taylor Swift.
Thinking out loud.
Warner.
Williams.
Williamson.
Publishing contract: Mark Taylor:
Sampling.[xviii] Beloved.
Hawkes.[xix]
Ludlow.
Walmsley.
Song creation/writing royalties: Spandau Ballet:
Armes.
Gloucester Place.[xx]
Website blocking injunction. EMI.
Duress. O’Sullivan.[xxi]
Image rights. Rihanna.[xxii]
Libel. Vardy.
Misrepresentation by conduct. Spice Girls.
Moral rights. Leahy.[xxiii]

Injunction granted because: (i) damages would be an inadequate remedy for both sides; and (ii) the preponderant inadequacy in the case of the plaintiffs, together with (iii) preservation of the status quo, favoured the grant of the injunction sought.

Passing Off.

 

Band name:

 

ABBA.
 

 

Blue:

–      ‘Are you seriously saying that fans of one group would mistake one for the other? One is aged like you and me, the other is a boy band.’

Settled. Agreed that both Bands could use the name.

Irvine.
Halliwell.
Liberty X:

‘Residual goodwill’ & Injunction granted.

One Direction:

–      Claim for $1m in damages & litigation risk of claims for 3 x profits made.

Settled. Agreed that both Bands could use the name

 

P Diddy.
Rihanna.
Waits.
Performer’s rights. Henderson.
Personality rights. Sponsorship agreement. Halliwell.
Ownership of goodwill in a Band’s name. Frankie.
Restraint of trade:

 

Was the contract fair?:

–      Was this an exclusive deal.

–      Relative bargaining power of parties.

–      Did the artist receive independent legal advice.

–      How experienced was the artist of the music business.

–      What are the ‘legitimate’ commercial interests of the Record Company.

–      What restrictions were placed on the artist.

 

 

 

Zang.[xxiv]

[‘A pop group entered into a recording contract with a record company which bound them, collectively and individually, for a period of up to nine years, following the initial seven-month period of the contract. A dispute arose between the group and the company and the group maintained that the contract was unenforceable because it was in restraint of trade. The company argued that even if the contract was unreasonably in restraint of trade, the pop group had waived their objections thereto.’ – Westlaw – WL 649770 (1989)].

 

 

 

Exclusive worldwide record deal.

 

George Michael:

–      Relative bargaining power.

–      As a successful & powerful artist GM  could stand up to Sony.

–      GM was independently advised by a lawyer who was experienced in music business contracts.

–      GM stood to gain financially from the contract.

–      Balancing out these factors the benefits to GM v. the restrictions on him were reasonable to protect Sony’s investment & ‘legitimate’ business interests.

–      Terms were reasonable.

Settled.

Release from an exclusive recording contract in return for: (i) a payment; and (ii) agreement to record new tracks and new versions of old tracks for a greatest hits album to be released by the Record Company.

 

 

Music Publishing Agreement. Frankie.
Taylor.
Macaulay:[xxv]

–      Terms unduly restrictive & an unreasonable restraint of trade.

–      Contract unenforceable.

[‘In determining the enforceability of a contract in restraint of trade the court will consider the fairness of the bargain having regard to whether the restrictions are both reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the promisee and commensurate with the benefits secured by the promisor. The plaintiff, an unknown songwriter aged 21, entered into standard form agreement with the defendant publishers who were to have the exclusive benefit of the plaintiff’s compositions, the full world copyright whereof was assigned to the defendants in return for a fixed percentage of any royalties received. The term of the agreement was expressed to be five years, which term was to be automatically extended by a further five years if the royalties payable to the plaintiff within the first five years should exceed GBP 5,000. The defendants could terminate or assign the benefit of the agreement whereas the plaintiff could do neither. There was no obligation upon the defendants under the agreement to publish or promote any composition of the plaintiff. The plaintiff obtained a declaration that the agreement was void as contrary to public policy’. – Westlaw – WL 41904 (1974)].

Wayne Rooney:

–      ‘Exorbitance or special feature’ brought contract withing ambit of the doctrine.

–      Included ‘Inequality of bargaining power.’

–      Finding of ‘a very substantial imbalance in bargaining power between the parties.’

–      Length of contract = half player’s [cf. performer’s] working life]. Correlation with the development of an overall strategic approach to exploitation of image rights was no justification.

–      Public policy imperative – restrictions of a person’s freedom to earn a living must be seen to operate fairly.

Zomba.
Share of royalties. Session musician claim. Beckingham.[xxvi]
Pink Floyd.
Song-writer split.[xxvii] Cure.
Status Quo.
Trademark. Band name:

 

Bravado.
Cartier.[xxviii]
Gill.[xxix]

[‘In order to successfully oppose the registration of a Community trade mark based on claimed priority from an earlier UK trade mark, the opponent had to demonstrate that the UK law on passing off conferred on it the possibility of prohibiting the use of a subsequent trade mark.’ – Westlaw – WL. 41909515 (2009)].

 

Lady Antebellum:

‘Residual Goodwill.’

Settled.

Lady A and Anita White Trademark Lawsuit Settled Mutually (vulture.com)

Former ‘Lady Antebellum’ Settles Legal Battle Over ‘Lady A’ Name – Billboard

 

Elvis.
Starbucks.
Taylor.
Undue Influence.
Music Management Agreement. Armatrading:

–      C sought a declaration that contract was void for undue influence, terms unreasonable & a restraint of trade. Contract set aside for undue influence. Terms were – ‘unduly onerous and unconscionable.’

–      Contract voidable from start. NB C did not receive independent legal advice before signing

Elton John – Reversal of the burden of proof.

[CAI – To cross-refer to commentary in Enonchong]

Seal:

–      Double-dipping settlement.

–      No UI.

–      Seal had received independent legal advice.

–      Seal was advised by an experienced manager.

–      D was not Seal’s manager at the time. Therefore he could not exercise UI because he was not in a position of trust & confidence with the artist.

Samuel (Professionally Known as Seal) v Wadlow – Case Law – VLEX 793967497

Enforcement under the Singapore Convention

The Singapore Convention will come into force in the UK six months after the UK has deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Headquarters in New York. The UK will also champion the Convention internationally to encourage further ratifications. Earlier Consultation (02.03.2023) stated:
‘Mediation is an important means of resolving cross‑border disputes, by enabling the disputing parties to reach a suitable and mutually acceptable resolution themselves, without having to go to court, saving valuable time and money. It is a process which the Government considers ought to be integral to the Justice system, and it is estimated that mediation can save businesses around £4.6 billion per year in management time, relationships, productivity, and legal fees. … The Singapore Convention on Mediation aims to provide a harmonised framework to enable parties seeking to enforce a cross-border commercial settlement agreement to apply directly to a Competent Authority (usually a Court) for the enforcement of that agreement. … The Convention may also present opportunities to establish new relationships in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East and Africa, as well as strengthening existing relationships with parties to the Convention, many of whom are members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.’

The Consultation Response stated:

‘The Government has concluded that it is the right time for the UK to become a Party to the Singapore Convention on Mediation, as a clear signal to our international partners that the UK is committed to maintaining and strengthening its position as a centre for dispute resolution and to promote the UK’s flourishing legal and mediation sectors. Mediation is a dispute resolution process which is integral to the UK justice system, and it is estimated that commercial mediation can save businesses around £5.9 billion per year in management time, relationships, productivity, and legal fees with the value of UK mediated cases each year being estimated at approximately £20bn as of February 2023. … CEDR stated that online mediation is here to stay and that ‘the nature of the field has permanently changed’ … the Government has also set out its vision to integrate mediation as an essential step within the court process for civil claims. Commercial mediation can support businesses who may be looking for more cost-effective methods of resolving their disputes, outside of the traditional routes of litigation and arbitration, with aspirations of preserving their important and potentially long-standing business relationships by reaching an amicable and mutually agreed resolution. The uniform framework for the effective recognition and enforcement of international mediated settlement agreements, which the Convention provides, will increase confidence to trade across borders and between different legal jurisdictions, by providing a clear and expedited process for resolving commercial disputes through mediation.’

See also:

Mandatory Mediation

The 2022 edition of the Chancery Guide, which was revised in June 2023, states;

‘10.8      The court may also stay the case or adjourn a hearing of its own motion to encourage and enable the parties to use ADR. The stay will be for a specified period and may include a date by which representatives of the parties with authority to settle and their legal advisers are required to meet, or a requirement for parties to exchange lists of neutral individuals who are available to carry out ADR and seek to agree on one. If agreement cannot be reached, the CMC can be restored for the court to facilitate agreement. Although the court may strongly recommend mediation, it cannot order that a mediation takes place and will not recommend an individual or body to facilitate ADR. …

10.10     Any order staying the case for ADR may (but is not required to) include an order as to the liability of the parties for the costs they incur in using or attempting to use ADR. Such order will usually be (a) costs in the case or (b) each side to bear its own costs.’

See: The Chancery Guide 2022 | Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

The court also has the power to order mandatory JENE, see my article about JENE on the publications page of this website.

HMCTS ‘Guide to the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Small Claims Track’ was published in July 2023 states::

4.3    ‘The IPEC SCT is only suitable for claims where the amount in dispute (not including costs) is £10,000 or less. If the claim has a value of more than £10,000, it is unlikely to be suitable for hearing in the SCT, unless the court orders otherwise. The IPEC SCT is suitable for claims where the remedies being sought are damages for infringement, an account of profits, delivery up or destruction of infringing items and/or a final injunction to prevent infringement in the future. Interim remedies (which are remedies ordered before the final hearing of the claim) such as interim injunctions, asset freezing orders and search and seizure orders are not available on the IPEC SCT. A claim seeking these remedies, which would otherwise be suitable for the IPEC SCT, should be made on the IPEC multi-track instead.’ …

7.12 ‘Like all civil courts, the IPEC SCT encourages parties to consider the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), as an alternative means of resolving disputes or particular issues within disputes. Parties to IPEC SCT cases may (or if required to do so, must) use ADR, including the Small Claims Mediation Service which is a FREE service provided by HM Courts & Tribunals Service (see Small claims mediation service – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)). It may only be accessed after a claim has been issued. Mediation appointments are conducted by telephone and so the parties are not required to attend at court or at the mediators’ offices. Parties can also mediate through the small claims mediator without speaking to one another. The mediation appointment is:

  • limited to one hour
  • confidential
  • only proceeds if both parties agree to mediation.

If mediation is unsuccessful then the parties will continue to a final hearing of their IPEC small claim as usual.’

See:

Business Arrangements & Contractual Matrix

Band Agreement.
LLC Articles of Association.
LLC Shareholders’ Agreement.
LLP Members’ Agreement.  
General Partnership Agreement.  
Management Contract. –      Territory.

–      Scope – i.e. activities covered.

–      Authority.

–      Remuneration.

–      Commission on what & how it is calculated.

–      Collection.

–      Expenses.

–      Tax.

–      Exclusivity.

–      Key-person provisions.

–      Term i.e. length of contract.

–      Album cycles.

–      Termination.

Record deal.[xxx] 2 types:

–      Licence[xxxi].

–      Exclusive recording contract.[xxxii]

Variations:

–      Production deal containing elements of both types.

–      360-degree model.[xxxiii]

Commercial issues:

–      Delivery requirements – minimum commitment by the artist.

–      Advances – NB the ‘Min-max’ formula, see Harrison p.101.

–      Payment terms.

–      Costs-inclusive advances.

–      Record budget.

–      Royalties.

–      Release commitments.

–      Accounting.

Licence. –      Exclusive or non-exclusive deal.

–      Term.

–      Territory.

–      Options.[xxxiv]

Exclusive deal. –      Term.

–      Options.

–      Two-album firm deals – Record company commits in advance to a second album.

–      Worldwide v. Territory & split-territory deals.

Development deals. ‘[The] Record label signs an artist up exclusively for a period of time during which the artist may record some demos or enough tracks for one or more EP’s. The artist is given a recording budget and the means to pay for a producer but not usually much more by way of money to live on. … If things go well with the development stage, then the record label usually has the option to decide to go on to make the rest of the album and probably then have options to make more albums as in a normal exclusive record deal.’ [Harrison p.92].
360-degree deals. ‘[These deals] involve all important aspects of an artist’s career. A record label may say to an artist-in effect – “we cannot make enough money just from selling your records to justify the level of advances, royalties and recording costs you want us to pay. We cannot invest the kind of marketing budget this record needs because we can’t make enough money from record sales alone. So, if we are going to sign/extend your record deal we can only do so on the basis that we also get a share of the money you make from other activities.” These activities might be songwriting but more commonly it means they want a share of the money the artist makes from selling tickets to their live concerts, from selling merchandise and from any sponsorship deals the artist does.’ [Harrison p.93].
Production deal. ‘[This] is usually a form of an exclusive recording agreement for the world, but one where the record label is an offshoot business of the record producer, or recording studio owner, or a manager who has access to cheap recording facilities, or a fan, or a songwriter who has decided to set up his own “label” to record an artist he has found who he thinks is talented. … The production company will expect to own the copyright in the sound recordings for life of copyright and to have at least a couple of options to extend the contract beyond an initial period. … The aim of these production companies is either to record up to, say, five tracks to good demo or master quality and use these to tempt a bigger company to come on board, or the production company records and releases some recordings themselves in order to hopefully create interest and have the bigger company come along and either buy the contract off them or license the rights often exclusively in return for an investment into marketing and promotion and reimbursement of recording costs.’ [‘Harrison, p.95].
Publishing deal.[xxxv] ‘Publishers have traditionally had three main roles. Firstly, they issue licences to people who want to use music. Secondly, they actively look for ways to use music-for example, putting a song they publish in an advert or on a film or videogame soundtrack. Thirdly, they collect the income from those licences and uses and account to the writers for their share of royalties. Licensing and collection of income are carried out in conjunction with the collection societies both locally in the home territory and internationally through their links with international collection societies as well as in the developing area of direct digital licensing. … Publishers have also become more adept at finding innovative ways to use the copyrights, including licensing song lyrics for inclusion on merchandise like mugs and T-shirts. Licensing songs for use in ads, films and video games has become even more important, most publishers have strengthened their synchronisation departments. … Neighbouring rights have become another possible source of revenue.’ [Harrison p.114 – 117 – see also the discussion in Harrison at 117 of the performers entitlement to an ‘equitable share’].
4 types:

–      Administration deal.

–      Sub-publishing deal.

–      Single-song assignment.

–      Fully exclusive song-writing deal.

[For a full discussion see Harrison pp. 137-162].[xxxvi]

Key commercial issues:

–      Exclusivity[xxxvii].

–      Rights granted.

–      Territory.

–      Rights period.

–      Term.

–      Fixed terms & rolling advances.

–      Minimum commitment.

–      Advances.

–      Royalties.[xxxviii]

–      Synchronization & cover royalties.

–      Performing income.

–      Accounting.

Production & Distribution deal (‘P&D’). –      Label services deal.

–      Catalogue or single release distribution deal.

[For a full discussion see Harrison pp.195-202].

Key commercial issues:

–      Exclusivity.

–      Term.

–      Territory.

–      Rights granted.

–      Price.

–      Payment terms.

–      Retention of title.

–      Advances.

Merchandising deal.[xxxix] Key commercial issues:

–      Territory.

–      Term.

–      Rights granted.

–      Quality control.

–      Methods of distribution.

–      Advances & guaranteed minimum payments.

–      Royalties & licence fees.

–      Accounting.

–      Trade mark & copyright notices.

–      Termination rights.

–      Enforcement.

–      360-degree models.

[For a detailed discussion see Harrison pp.250-257].

Sponsorship & Endorsement deals.[xl] Key commercial issues:

–      The services.

–      Exclusivity.

–      Territory.

–      Creative control.

–      Term.

–      Banner advertising at venues.

–      Meet & greets.

–      Freebies & promotional activities.

–      Trademark licences & goodwill.

–      Payment.

Booking agency contract.[xli] Key commercial issues:

–      Exclusivity.

–      Territory.

–      Term.

–      Booking agent’s duties.

–      Artist’s/Band’s duties.

–      Fee.

–      Accounting.

–      Assignment & key-person provisions.

Promoter’s contract.[xlii] Key commercial issues:

–      Artist’s/Band’s obligations.

–      Promoter’s obligations.

–      Artists’ riders.

–      Fees.

–      Payment. & accounting.

–      Other income.

–      Restrictions.

–      Regulatory compliance – The Licensing Act 2003[xliii]; Live Music Act 2012[xliv]; and the Private Security Industry (Licences) Regulations 2004[xlv].

[For a detailed discussion see Harrison, pp. 292 – 299].

 

Fiduciary Duties owed by Managers & their Companies to Artists

The essential idea is that a person who undertakes and is entrusted with authority to manage the property or affairs of another, and to make discretionary decisions on behalf of that person, i.e. a manager, is not permitted to use their position for their own private advantage, and is required to act unselfishly in what they perceive to be the best interests of their principal, i.e. the artist.  This is the core of the obligation of loyalty. Loyalty in this context, means being guided:

(i)      solely by the interests of the principal; and

(ii)     not by any consideration of the fiduciary’s own interests.

To promote such decision-making, a manager must:

(iii)     act openly and honestly; and

(iv)    not (without the informed consent of the artist) place                              himself in a position where either:

(a)     his own interests; or

(b)     his duty to another person,

may conflict with his duty to pursue the interests of the artist.

Managers are also liable to account for any profit obtained for themselves as a result of their fiduciary position.

‘The usual remedy where the fiduciary has breached a fiduciary duty is rescission of any transaction entered into by the fiduciary with or on behalf of the principal, and the fiduciary will be liable to disgorge to the principal any profit made from the breach of duty. But equity can also require the fiduciary to compensate the principal for any loss suffered as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty. It follows that the principal may have to elect between disgorgement and compensatory remedies. The choice of remedy will be determined by whether the loss suffered by the principal is greater than the profit obtained by the fiduciary. The principal will not be able to recover both compensatory and disgorgement remedies, since this would result in double recovery. The fiduciary may also hold profit obtained from breaching the fiduciary duty on constructive trust for the principal, so that the principal has an equitable proprietary interest in the property held on trust, which will provide a basis for a proprietary claim.’ (Virgo, paragraph 15.1.5). See also my article about electing between equitable remedies on the ‘Publications’ page of this website.

The following remedial consequences flow from breach of fiduciary duty:

(i)      establishing breach gives rise to a range of equitable remedies which might not otherwise be available, including:

(a)     account and enquiries; and

(b)     obligations to disgorge profits;

(ii)      benefits obtained in breach of fiduciary duty (including bribes and secret commissions), will be held on a constructive trust for the principal, giving him the ability to:

  • recover them in priority to other creditors in the event of

the fiduciary’s insolvency;

  • take the benefit of any appreciation in value; and

(c)     trace or follow them into the hands of third parties and substitute assets.

For a person to be liable for breach of fiduciary duty, he must have breached the duty by an intentional act. An unconscious omission will not be sufficient. To prove breach:

(i)      It is not necessary to demonstrate that the fiduciary has breached some other duty owed to the principal by reason of his self-interest.

(ii)     It is irrelevant that the dealing was ‘fair’, or has benefitted the principal.

(iii)     It is also irrelevant that the fiduciary’s potentially conflicting interest is not one that the principal could himself have exploited.

(iv)    It is not necessary to demonstrate that the fiduciary acted in ‘bad faith’, or ‘dishonestly’.

A fiduciary will therefore be held liable even:

(a)     If he did not act fraudulently or in bad faith.

(b)     Where he honestly believed that he was acting in good faith, (Murad v. Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 969).

Liability for breach of fiduciary duty is strict. In other words, it is not necessary for the principal to prove  either that:

(c)     They suffered harm as a result of the breach.

(d)     Any profit obtained by the fiduciary can be attributed to the breach. Non-disclosure can amount to breach of fiduciary duty (see my article on the ‘Publications’ page of this website about the ‘Quiet Fiduciary Thesis’), because a fiduciary must not be silent.

It appears that breach of the fiduciary dealing rules which could give rise to a claim in equitable compensation, generates a positive obligation of disclosure, Gwembe Valley Development Company Ltd v. Koshy [2002] EWCA Civ 1805.

Copyright

Copyright underlies all creative aspects of the music industry. See also CLIP | Creators Learn Intellectual Property (goclip.org).

Scope of protection.[xlvi] Copyright protects expressions. Copyright and related rights are national rights.[xlvii] Consequently, the requirement of originality varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Copyright is not concerned with the originality of ideas but with the expression of thought. The originality which is required relates to the expression of the thought. This does not require that the expression must be in an original novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work, i.e. that it should originate from the author. The standard required for a work to qualify as original is low. No specific measure of originality is required. In substance what is required is that the work is the result of the author’s own intellectual creation, i.e. that it is the result of skill and labour/intellectual creation, see paragraphs 51-54 of the judgment of HHJ Birss QC in Temple Island v. New English Teas [2012]. The governing statute is the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 [the ‘CDPA’]. Section  1(1) CDPA provides:

‘(1)    Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance with this Part in the following descriptions of work—

(a)     original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works,

(b)     sound recordings, films or broadcasts, and

(c)     the typographical arrangement of published editions.’

In general, a work will be protected by UK copyright provided either:

(i) that the author is at the material time a ‘qualifying person’ i.e. a British national or is resident or domiciled in one of the countries of the Berne Union or a country which is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention ; or

(ii) that the work was first ‘published’ in one of these countries [Sections 156-156 CDPA]. Section 175 CDPA provides:

‘(1)    In this Part “publication”, in relation to a work—

(a)     means the issue of copies to the public, and

(b)     includes, in the case of a …, musical … work, making it available to the public by means of an electronic retrieval system;

and related expressions shall be construed accordingly.

(2)     In this Part “commercial publication”, in relation to a …  musical … work means—

(a)     issuing copies of the work to the public at a time when copies made in advance of the receipt of orders are generally available to the public, or

(b)     making the work available to the public by means of an electronic retrieval system;

and related expressions shall be construed accordingly.

(4)     The following do not constitute publication for the purposes of this Part and references to commercial publication shall be construed accordingly—

(a)     in the case of a … musical work—

(I)      the performance of the work, or

(ii)      the communication to the public of the work (otherwise than for the purposes of an electronic retrieval system); …

(c)     in the case of a sound recording or film—

(i)      the work being played or shown in public, or

(ii)      the communication to the public of the work].

(5)     References in this Part to publication or commercial publication do not include publication which is merely colourable and not intended to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public.

(6)     No account shall be taken for the purposes of this section of any unauthorised act.’

Sheet Music. Protected as literary works.
Lyrics. Song lyrics are protected as literary works when they are written down.[xlviii]
Melody – Musical Works. Protected by copyright as a musical work.[xlix]
Master Sound Recording. The sound recording, or phonogram, has its own copyright.[l]
Arrangement, Arrangements

Section 21 of the CDPA provides that it is an infringement of copyright in a musical work to make an “arrangement” of it. A musical arrangement is “an adaptation of a musical composition for instruments or voices for which it is not written” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). It is possible that sampling will infringe this right, depending on the sampling in question. More loosely speaking, many arrangements of musical works would amount to copying a musical work (section 16(1)(a) of the CDPA). Changing the key or tempo in which the composition was originally composed would both be capable of constituting an infringement; so too would mixing part of a composition with another composition. This is because the restricted act of “copying” will have taken place. Arguably, both the composition as sampled and the composition in which the sample appears would require the consent of the copyright owners of both compositions appearing in the mix. In cases where the style of the original composition has been used, infringements would be more difficult to prove. However, in Austin v. Columbia Gramophone Co., an infringement of an arrangement was proved where a composer took the original tunes on which the arrangement had been based and imitated the musical ideas but did not use the actual notes used by the plaintiff. It is not, however, an infringement of copyright to make an adaptation or an arrangement of a sound recording.

Rights in the New Arrangement

The author of an arrangement has the right to prevent a third party from copying his arrangement of the composition. In Zyx Music v. Pinnacle it was held that this would be so, irrespective of whether or not the arrangement was made with the consent of the copyright owner of the original composition. In this case proceedings were taken for infringement of the copyright in a “disco” or “dance” version of the song “Please Don’t Go” originally recorded by KC and the Sunshine Band. By mixing two compositions together the producer who mixes the two compositions together may obtain a copyright in that new arrangement. In that event, he will be able to prevent any third party, including the owners of the copyright in both original compositions and sound recordings, from reproducing that arrangement. Copyright protection may subsist if use is made of an earlier work. As stated by the Privy Council in MacMillan & Co. Ltd v. K & J Cooper, “To secure copyright it is necessary that the skill, labour and capital expended should be sufficient to impart to the producer some quality or character which the raw material did not possess, differentiating the product from the raw material”. Although it is doubtful whether the expenditure of “capital” is necessary, a fresh copyright will come into being provided sufficient further skill, labour, taste, judgment or knowledge has been used. In deciding whether or not the new work created by the sampling is such as to merit copyright protection the proper approach is to consider the work as a whole and to ascertain whether or not it is original, and not to inquire whether each part of the work is sufficiently original. To follow the latter course is to ignore the originality that may arise through the assembly and treatment of the individual parts. Copyright may subsist in a work even if it infringes the copyright in another work. In Zyx Music Lightman J. approved the view that a plaintiff in such circumstances is entitled to prevent others from copying his work, subject to his obligation to account to the original author for his due share of any recovery. This approach was upheld by the Court of Appeal.’ (Abrahamson & Bale).

 

Album Artwork. The artwork for a song or album can be protected by copyright as an artistic work: this includes a graphic work, photograph or collage.[li]
Photographs. Copyright subsists in original artistic works,s.1(1)(a) of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 [‘CDPA’]. ‘Artistic work’ includes a ‘photograph’. ‘Photograph’ means a ‘recording of light or other radiation on any medium on which an image is produced or from which an image made by any means be produced and which is not part of a film’ (s.4(2) CDPA).

In Temple Island v. New English Teas [2012] WSPCC 1 the claimant claimed infringement of copyright. Judge Birss KC in finding in in favour of the Claimant stated: ‘This superficially simple question involves a tricky area of law, i.e. copyright in photographs; and, in the end, turns on a disputed qualitative judgment. … A photograph of an object found in nature or for that matter a building, which although not natural is something found by the creator and not created by him, can have the character of an artistic work in terms of copyright law if the task of taking the photograph leaves ample room for an individual arrangement. What is decisive are the arrangements (motif, visual angle, illumination etc) selected by the photographer. … What then is the scope of photographic copyright? The question is answered by drawing attention to 3 aspects in which there is room for originality in photography:

1.   Residing in specialities of angle of shot, light and shade, exposure and effects achieved with filters, developing techniques and so on;

2.   Residing in the creation of the scene to be photographed;

3.   Deriving from being in the right place at the right time .

[The] composition of a photograph is capable of being a source of originality. The composition of an image will … derive from the “angle shot” … but also from the field of view … elements which the photographer may have created and … elements arising from being in the right place at the right time. The resulting composition is capable of being the aggregate result of all these factors … Ultimately … the composition of the image can be the product of the skill and labour (or intellectual creation) of a photographer and … skill and labour/intellectual creation directed to that end can give rise to copyright.

Copyright is infringed by reproducing the whole or a substantial part of the work in a material form (s.16  and s.17 CDPA). [A] “substantial part” is a matter of quality not quantity. … Copying a photograph does not require a facsimile reproduction, it is enough to recreate the scene or a substantial part of it.  … As a matter of principle photographs, as one species of artistic work in s.4 of the Act, are not to be treated differently from other artistic works and  one consequence must be that s.17 cannot be construed as referring only to facsimile reproductions of a photograph itself. … Visual significance must also be relevant to infringement and to the question of whether a substantial part of an artistic work has been taken. What falls to be considered, in order to decide if a substantial part of an artistic work has been reproduced, are elements of the work which had visual significance. What is visually significant in an artistic work is not the skill and labour (or intellectual creative effort) which led up to the work, it is the product of that activity. The fact that the artist may have used commonplace techniques to produce his work is not the issue. What is important is that he or she has used them under the guidance of their own aesthetic sense to create the visual effect in question. Just because the Act provides for copyright in these original artistic works irrespective of their artistic quality (s.41(a) does not mean that one ignores what they look like and focuses only on the work which went into creating them.  … On the question of copying, I find the common elements between the defendants work and the claimant’s work are causally related. In other words, they have been copied.’

Infringement.[lii] ‘Essentially, [Primary] infringement of the copyright work can be summarised as the taking of the whole, or a substantial part, of the copyright protected work, without permission of the copyright owner or the benefit of a copyright exception. … Each country has its own tests or factors which it will apply to determine if the part taken was substantial. The first thing to know is that there is no numerical number or amount of the work that determines if it is substantial. There is no set number of notes that can be taken from a song, and no length of a sample, that we can say for sure would not constitute infringement. There is a common misconception that there is a minimum number of notes that people can take from a song, or a certain number of seconds from a video clip, in order to avoid infringement. This is incorrect. Instead it depends on the quality of what is taken – not the quantity. The quality of what is taken is determined by referring to the original aspects of the copied work. … In the UK, the meaning a substantial part is developed in the case law. The UK courts have said that it is to be a matter of quality, not quantity, and that quality is to be determined by reference to the reason the work is protected by copyright: the originality. This means that if the parts taken are the original elements of the work, it is more likely to be infringement. However, if the parts taken are the non-original or non-protectable parts, such as the general idea, then it is unlikely to be infringement. … Secondary copyright infringement relates to situations where a person has not themselves directly infringed, but contributed to the infringement. It is also sometimes referred to as indirect infringement, or associated infringement. … The main difference between primary and secondary copyright liability is that for secondary infringement, the person is not liable unless they knew or had reason to believe that they were handling infringing copies, or, in the case of the performance, that the performance would infringe copyright. (Bosher, paragraphs 11.2;11.3; and 11.4).[liii]

 

Fair dealing & exceptions

The exceptions are:

  • Research and private study.
  • Criticism, review or quotation.
  • News reporting (which does not apply to photographs).
  • Caricature, parody and pastiche.

While there is no statutory definition of precisely what dealing is fair, the English court applies an objective test enquiring ‘whether any fair-minded honest person would have dealt with the copyright work, in the manner that [the defendant] did, for the purpose [specified]. Hyde Park Residence Limited v. Yelland [2000] EWCA Civ, 37,38 (Lord Justice Aldous): Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland & Ors [2000] EWCA Civ 37 (10 February 2000) (bailii.org)

In Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, Lord Denning stated, ‘[it] is impossible to define what is fair dealing. It must be a question of degree.’

Lord Denning proposed three factors:

  • the number and extent of the reproductions;
  • the use made of the reproductions; and
  • the proportion of the work consisting of reproductions compared to the proportion of work consisting of comment and analysis.

He concluded that ‘after all is said and done, it must be a matter of impression.’

‘The CPD provides for a potential exception outside of the provisions reads more like a caveat than an explicitly carved out exception: “Nothing in this part affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.” However, this possible defence is rarely applied: thus, there is no well-developed doctrine of public interest defence in the UK. … The European Convention on Human Rights [‘EHCR’], which was incorporated into the law the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998, lists certain acts that are expressly permitted under the CPDA without a licence. In particular, Article 10 of the ECHR, which is generally referred to as “freedom of expression”, includes the right to impart both information and ideas, which may be at odds with copyright ownership. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ.1142, which was ultimately dismissed on appeal, is nevertheless important for establishing that article 10 of the ECHR considerations “might, in an appropriate case, require the court to grant public interest defence beyond the protection offered under s.30 of the [CPDA] for fair dealing.” However, as the court made clear, this defence would not allow for a right to “make free use of another’s work” or profit without adequate compensation.’ (Prowda, p.94).

Research and private study – Section 29 CPDA provides:

(1)     Fair dealing with a. work for the purposes of research for a non-commercial purpose does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.

(1B)  No acknowledgement is required in connection with fair dealing for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1) where this would be impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise.

(1C)  Fair dealing with a  work for the purposes of private study does not infringe any copyright in the work.

(3)     Copying by a person other than the researcher or student himself is not fair dealing if—

(a)     in the case of a librarian, or a person acting on behalf of a librarian, that person does anything which is not permitted under section 42A (copying by librarians: single copies of published works), or

(b)     in any other case, the person doing the copying knows or has reason to believe that it will result in copies of substantially the same material being provided to more than one person at substantially the same time and for substantially the same purpose.

(4 )    It is not fair dealing—

(a)     to convert a computer program expressed in a low level language into a version expressed in a higher level language, or

(b)     incidentally in the course of so converting the program, to copy it,

(these acts being permitted if done in accordance with section 50B (decompilation)).

(4A)  It is not fair dealing to observe, study or test the functioning of a computer program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program (these acts being permitted if done in accordance with section 50BA (observing, studying and testing)).

(4B)  To the extent that a term of a contract purports to prevent or restrict the doing of any act which, by virtue of this section, would not infringe copyright, that term is unenforceable.’

Therefore, subject to a proviso, the principal permitted uses are:

  • research for a non-commercial purpose; and
  • private study.

Criticism, review or quotation – Section 30 CPDA provides:

‘(1)    Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement (unless this would be impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise)] and provided that the work has been made available to the public.

(1ZA)          Copyright in a work is not infringed by the use of a quotation from the work (whether for criticism or review or otherwise) provided that—

(a)     the work has been made available to the public,

(b)     the use of the quotation is fair dealing with the work,

(c)     the extent of the quotation is no more than is required by the specific purpose for which it is used, and

(d)     the quotation is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement (unless this would be impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise).]

(1A) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (1ZA)] a work has been made available to the public if it has been made available by any means, including—

(a)     the issue of copies to the public;

(b)     making the work available by means of an electronic retrieval system;

(c)     the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public;

(d)     the performance, exhibition, playing or showing of the work in public;

(e)     the communication to the public of the work,

but in determining generally for the purposes of those subsections whether a work has been made available to the public no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act.’

Therefore, subject to provisos, the principal permitted use is use of a quotation from the work (whether for criticism or review or otherwise).

News reporting (which does not apply to photographs) – Section 30(2) and (3) CPDA provides:

(2)    Fair dealing with a work (other than a photograph) for the purpose of reporting current events does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that (subject to subsection (3)) it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.’

‘(3)    No acknowledgement is required in connection with the reporting of current events by means of a sound recording, film or broadcast where this would be impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise.’

Therefore, subject to the proviso, the principal permitted use is reporting of current events by means of a sound recording, film or broadcast.

Caricature, parody and pastiche –  Section 30(A) CPDA provides:

‘(1)    Fair dealing with a work for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche does not infringe copyright in the work.’

Sampling

‘A sample can be used to describe three different but related methods of appropriating and adapting pre-existing musical ideas: a direct sample of a pre-existing recording, usually via digital sampling or digital recording technology: an interpolation, where phrases, melody and/or lyrics are taken from a pre-existing composition but without any attempt to copy the sound or timbre of the original recorded performance: and a replay which recreates part or parts of an existing record with the intention of sounding as close as possible to the original. If using a direct, or phonographic, sample in a new piece of music, there are two copyrights and two sets of clearances required: the copyright of the musical work (the song, including the lyrics, or composition – referred to in the industry as the “publishing copyright” or “publishing”) and the copyright of the recording sampled (the “master copyright” or “master”). When employing either an interpolation or a sample replay, only the copyright in the musical work needs to be cleared.’ (Harrison and Rigg, page 49).

Copyright in the Original Sound Recording

Sampling a sound recording (by copying or mixing the original sounds onto another recording) without the consent of the copyright owner will be an infringement of copyright in the original sound recording, if the amount taken amounts to a “substantial part” of the sound recording (sections 16(1)(a), 16(3)(a) of the CDPA). However, no infringement of the copyright in the sound recording will occur if the actual sounds from the original sound recording are not made use of. This would be the case for re-recordings; see above.2 Depending on what parts of the original sound recording have been sampled, it may be possible to argue that the sound recording bearing the sample does not reproduce a substantial part of the original sound recording. Whether or not a substantial part of the sound recording has been reproduced will always be a matter of degree. It is suggested that the proper test is to ask whether the sounds taken amount to something real and consequential, as opposed to something trifling or insignificant. Copyright in sound recordings is rather different to that in literary, artistic and musical works, when originality is required in order for the work to attract copyright. This may prevent the taking of non-trivial fractions of such works (see below). However, sound recording copyright is different. No originality is required for a recording to attract copyright (except if the recording is a copy of another recording–section 5(2) of the CDPA); hence the test of substantial part is slightly different.3 Accordingly, before sampling a sound recording, the consent of the owner of the original sound recording may well be required, and should be considered in every case.

Copyright in the Original Composition

Similarly with the underlying composition embodied on the sound recording, sampling a sound recording without the consent of the owner of the copyright in the underlying composition will be an infringement of the copyright in the composition if a substantial part of the composition is used. Where the composition consists of music and lyrics it is necessary to bear in mind that there will be two copyrights relating to the musical and literary copyrights respectively. The copyright in the composition will usually (but not always) be owned by the writer’s publisher whose consent will therefore be required (in addition to any necessary consents from the record company) before sampling. The consent of the owner of the copyright in the composition will still be required even where it is intended to sample the composition by re-recording. This is because it is an infringement of copyright in musical and literary works to copy them in any material form (section 17(2) of the CDPA). The test of substantiality in a literary and/or musical work is again one of degree. The quality of what has been taken is more important than the quantity of abstracted material.4 For example, in one case use of a few lyrics, which constituted no more than a very small proportion of the work in question, amounted to an infringement.5 Similarly, in Hawkes & Son Ltd v. Paramount Film Services Ltd 6 28 bars of a well-known march were performed by a band. The extract lasted less than a minute and the whole march would have taken about four minutes. The bars taken constituted the main theme of the march. Not surprisingly, it was held that an infringement had been committed.

On the other hand, a long extract may not amount to an infringement if the selection does not comprise original material.7 A few bars taken from the composition may well be an infringement of copyright, but sampling does not always work like that. Sometimes, it is just the drum or a bass line that is taken and mixed with another composition. Although the drum or bass line may be recognisable, it may be very difficult for the artist or publishing company to establish that that drum or bass line were in fact original to the artist concerned. There are, of course, only so many rhythms in popular music and many drum and bass lines are in fact themselves copies of previous works. If the drum or bass lines are not original, then no action for breach of copyright will lie.

Much modern popular music is computer generated. When a bass or drum line is sampled, very often the sampler will not take the whole bass or drum line from a recording, but will instead take a couple of bars and then play those bars in an endless loop over and over again. Where many recordings make use of drum machines rather than live drummers, the original recording may well have been recorded in this manner in the first place. Whilst a few bars of a whole recording might or might not amount to a substantial part, it is more doubtful whether a couple of bars of just the drum line or bass line would do.

The United Kingdom music industry has developed an unwritten “three second rule”. Where three seconds or less of a work are sampled, no action is customarily taken against the sampler. Whilst this may be the custom of the music industry, it is by no means clear that it is sound in law. Whether or not three seconds of a work can be sampled with impunity must depend on applying the law to the facts of each case.’ (Abrahamson & Bale). See also Bosher, paragraphs 11.2;11.3; and 11.4 – the 3 second rule is a fallacy, and ‘Infringement’ above.

Songwriter splits & shares

‘Writer credits take the form of songwriter “splits.” These splits convey the extent of each writer’s interest in a work. . … [As] the number of writers per song has expanded, so too has the universe of possible split allocations. There are no rules that govern splits. They are entirely the product of negotiation, custom, relationships, and inertia. They may be split evenly among writers or they may be split unevenly: they may be allocated by type of contribution (e.g. lyrics, melody, arrangement, production), or extensive contribution, or without regard to either: they may adhere to customs, or they may appear entirely random or nonsensical. In the end, any allocation as possible so long as it sums to 100%. Songwriter’s differ on how and when to discuss splits. Some prefer to finalise everything prior to collaborating. Some prepare and sign “split sheets”, which stipulate, and allow for signatures to agree to split arrangements. This has obvious advantages, including clarity, formality, and administrators finality – allowing creatives to focus on creativity. It also has drawbacks: many writers feel that interjecting what are effectively legal of monetary negotiations into the music making process can be awkward and uncomfortable, chilling creativity. An upfront approach can also yield a result where splits do not align with actual contributions, which may miff those who end up contributing more. To that end, some prefer to work out splits after a song is complete, based on actual contributions. But the exercise of clinically attempting to quantify intangible inputs can breed its own awkwardness, which some believe can constrain the ongoing relationships that all agree are vital to songwriting careers.’ (Abowd, page 177).

Abowd identifies three principal songwriter dispute scenarios:

  • Where a writer feels that they have been allocated to small a share, or unfairly cut out of a song in its entirety.
  • When a passive or fringe participant asserts a songwriting claim that the other writers dispute.
  • Where a recording artist leverages a larger than deserved split due to outsized bargaining power – ‘Change a word , get a third.’[liv]

Trademark

Ownership of goodwill in a Band’s name

[Frankie case].

Performing rights

‘Performing rights are the rights performers have to prevent someone else from doing certain things with their performances, or with recordings of their performances, without their permission. The basic performing rights are … the right to prevent someone making a recording of a live performance and the right to prevent the communication of it to the public. It is also a performer’s right to prevent someone from making a recording of their performance directly from a broadcast or cable programme. The performers permission has to be obtained to do any of the above. … The performer also has the right to refuse to let someone make a copy of the recording issue a copy of recording to the public: rent or lend copies of the recording to the public: play a recorded performance in public: or include it in a broadcast or cable programme service.’ [Harrison p.80].[lv]

In a Performers’ Rights dispute, a Mediator can adopt a ‘Facilitative’, ‘Evaluative’, or a ‘Hybrid’ approach, often blending styles to address both ‘Creative’ and ‘Commercial’ issues.

Most professional Music and Performers’ Rights Dispute Mediators blend Facilitative and Evaluative techniques as the situation requires.

They might facilitate dialogue in joint sessions and use private caucuses to reality-test legal arguments and explore creative solutions.

Since IP law in this field is ‘nuanced’, these claims involve a high degree of litigation risk.

So, a highly effective approach for this specialized field is to use an industry-savvy neutral who understands intellectual property law, and industry practices.

A Mediator can adopt several specialized ‘Strategies’ tailored to the ‘nuances’ of the Music Industry.

The Mediator can guide parties to explore imaginative solutions such as shared credits, future collaboration agreements, revised delivery timetables, or specific marketing adjustments, which often go beyond simple financial damages.

The Mediator can ‘re-frame’ highly emotional creative disagreements (e.g., ‘final cut’ or ‘artistic integrity’) into commercial terms (e.g., ‘audience engagement’ or ‘revenue potential’), to facilitate more objective negotiation.

Becuase the Music Industry involves significant power imbalances, a skilled Mediator must be vigilant in ensuring fairness and neutrality, e.g. by using private caucuses to empower the less powerful party and ensure their voice is heard without fear of reprisal.

Emphasizing the confidential nature of Mediation can encourage open dialogue and protect sensitive information (budgets, private agreements, brand reputation), which is a major concern in high-profile Music and Performers’ Rights Disputes.

Mediators can facilitate the early and targeted exchange of critical information, e.g. profit participation statements or chain-of-title schedules, which might otherwise be leveraged unfairly by the party with more data.

The Mediator might propose involving a neutral industry expert, such as a forensic accountant for a royalties dispute or a valuation specialist, to provide an impartial assessment that helps move negotiations forward.

Mediators can identify and use external deadlines, to create a sense of urgency and encourage settlement momentum.

In complex disputes involving multiple stakeholders (performers, agents, producers, distributors), the Mediator can design a process using Pre-Mediation calls and breakout groups to manage diverse interests and move toward an integrated settlement.

By employing these approaches, a Mediator can effectively guide the Participants toward a mutually acceptable, sustainable, and often creative resolution, that preserves professional relationships, and avoids the time, cost and publicity of litigation.

The terms ‘final cut’ and ‘artistic integrity’ represent core points of contention, often used interchangeably to refer to the ultimate creative control over a finished work. The concepts are intrinsically linked.

A party seeking ‘final cut’ is doing so in service of preserving their ‘artistic integrity’ and ‘vision’.

‘Final cut’ is the specific legal mechanism or ‘contractual right’ being fought over.

‘Artistic integrity’ is the motivating principle or justification a creator uses to argue why they should have the ‘final cut’.

The conflict boils down to ‘art’ v. ‘commerce’.

The creator wants their ‘vision’ protected (‘artistic integrity’) and views the ‘final cut’ right as the only way to ensure that protection, while the financial backers want to protect their ‘investment’ and may use their control over the final cut to enforce changes that ‘maximize commercial viability’.

In entertainment disputes, ‘profit participation statements’ represent the formal accounting of revenue and expenses used to calculate a participant’s share of a project’s earnings, while ‘chain-of-title schedules’ represent the documented legal history of ownership and intellectual property rights.

Profit participation statements are financial documents provided by a studio or distributor to those who are contractually entitled to a share of the project’s profits (e.g., actors, writers, directors, producers, investors). In a dispute.

They are crucial because:

(i) The statements itemize all gross receipts, distribution fees, production costs (negative costs), interest, and overhead fees that are used to determine ‘net profits’.

(ii) Participants use these statements to verify that the numbers and accounting methods align with the specific terms of their contracts.

(iii) The statements provide the necessary financial data for a participant (or their forensic accountant) to decide whether to initiate a formal audit to challenge discrepancies or ensure fair payment.

A chain-of-title schedule is a comprehensive paper trail of all agreements and documents that establish who owns or controls the rights to a creative work.

Moral Rights

Moral rights are noneconomic rights in creative works, which protect the superior interests of human genius. Therefore, a work of music must be protected and kept as it emerged from the imagination of its author and later conveyed to posterity. In the UK moral rights continue for the duration of copyright protection, with the exception of the right of attribution which lasts the life of the author plus 20 years, and can pass to an author’s heirs upon death. Section 80 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 [the ‘CDPA’] provides:

‘(2)   For the purposes of this section—

(a)    “treatment” of a work means any addition to, deletion from or alteration to or adaptation of the work, other than— …

(ii)     an arrangement or transcription of a musical work involving no more than a change of key or register; and

(b)    the treatment of a work is derogatory if it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director…

and in the following provisions of this section references to a derogatory treatment of a work shall be construed accordingly.

(8)    This section has effect subject to sections 81 and 82 (exceptions to and qualifications of right).’

Section 81 CDPA provides:

‘(1)   The right conferred by section 80 (right to object to derogatory treatment of work) is subject to the following exceptions.

(2)    The right does not apply to a computer program or to any computer-generated work.

(3)    The right does not apply in relation to any work made for the purpose of reporting current events.’

It is not clear what amounts to derogatory treatment, but it seems that as well as there being either a distortion or mutilation this must be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the artist. In Tidy v. Trustees of the Natural History Museum [1196] 39 IPR 501] HHJ Overend, sitting in the Plymouth County Court stated:

“In my judgement what the plaintiff must establish is that the treatment accorded to his work is either a distortion or a mutilation that prejudices his honour or reputation as an artist. It is not sufficient that the author is himself aggrieved by what has occurred.”

Case law on moral rights in the UK is sparse. In Confetti Records Ltd v. Warner Music UK Ltd [2003] EWHC 1274, the court applied the two-part test set forth in section 80(2)(b) of the CDPA (above):

(i)     adaptation that amounted to distortion, mutilation, modification, or other derogatory action, and

(ii)     this would be prejudicial to honour or reputation.

‘Analyzing these factors in light of article 6bis of the Berne Convention, the court concluded that an author can object to distortion, mutilation, or modification of his work only if it is prejudicial to his honour or reputation. The mere fact that the work is distorted is not enough. … The court dismissed the case, in part because it found no evidence of prejudice [to the author’s] honour or reputation, and therefore concluded that there was no derogatory treatment. Some commentators have noted that without a definitive ruling in the High Court after a full trial, or indeed at a higher court at all, the scope of derogatory treatment in the UK remains uncertain. It is clear, however, that there must be prejudice to the author’s honour or reputation and that the test is objective, rather than subjective. Also, taking into account the interpretation of article 6bis of the Berne Convention, “derogatory” would suggest a subjective standard, but still subject to the more objective criterion of prejudice to honour or reputation, and analogous to the personal interests protected by the law of defamation.’ (Prowda, p.116).

Therefore, to succeed at trial, an artist must persuade the court that a distortion, mutilation, modification, or other derogatory action defacement is also prejudicial to his/her honour or reputation. Expert evidence, if it can be obtained and is admissible, is likely to be of assistance to the court. Disparaging tweets and other communications received on social media may also support the artist’s case. While it is generally accepted that mere placement of a work within a larger context would not qualify as a ‘treatment’ since there is no addition, deletion, alteration, or adaption, because Section 80(b) CDPA formulates the legal test of derogatory treatment as including anything that ‘is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author’, it is arguable that placement of a work within a larger context amounts to derogatory treatment where the overall impression is prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author. For example, a right wing politician playing part of a work by a left wing artist at a political rally.

Image rights

‘Image rights … allow [a person] to control the commercial use of their name, likeness and other personal in dysuria including physical characteristics associated with them.’ These rights are linked to branding and endorsement deals. See Harrison & Rigg, Chapter 12. Note, that ‘there is a cost applied to each branding deal which not only represents the value of the artist endorsement within that certain product category space, but it also represents reputational risk, overexposure and dilution of their market value.’ (Harrison & Rigg, page. 249).

[See also – Douglas & Rihanna cases].

Breach of confidence

[Oasis case]

Duress

Undue Influence

In equity undue influence can be presumed. Where presumed undue influence is alleged the evidential burden falls on the claimant to demonstrate that either:

(i)    there was a relationship giving rise to a presumption of trust and confidence (such as manager and artists) similar to a fiduciary relationship; or

(ii)    that the nature of the relationship that existed between the two parties in fact had this characteristic; and

(iii)   that the transaction cannot be readily accounted for by the ordinary motives of persons ordinarily in that relationship such that exercise of undue influence is the most logical explanation for the transaction (Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v. Etridge (AP) [2001] UKHL 44).

If the parties are in a relationship which gives rise to a presumption of trust and confidence, it is not necessary for the claimant to prove that the donor of a lifetime gift actually reposed trust and confidence in the other party, or that the other party dominated the relationship (Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v. Etridge (AP) [2001]). Nor is there any requirement to prove that the person accused of exercising undue influence did so intentionally or maliciously (Pesticcio v. Huet [2003] All ER (D) 237 (Apr), ChD). Once the presumption has been raised it falls on the other party to rebut it. To dispel the presumption of undue influence it will be necessary to show that all reasonable steps were taken, for example by a solicitor advising on the establishment of a settlement, to conclude that the settlor was acting on his or her own free will, understood what was being done and its effect (Smith v. Cooper [2010] EWCA Civ 722).

In Hart & Anor v. Burbidge & Ors [2013] EWHC 1628 (Ch) (upheld in the Court of Appeal), Sir William Blackburne said that there is no distinction between actual and presumed undue influence as regards the nature of the influence and its effect. The difference lies merely in the manner of its proof. In both it must be shown that the influence in question led to the making of the impugned transaction, and that it was undue in the sense that the transaction was not the result of the free exercise of an independent will on the part of the person at whose expense the transaction was made. In the case of actual undue influence it is for the person complaining of the influence to prove affirmatively that the transaction in question was caused by the influence alleged.

Sir William Blackburne observed that in the case of presumed undue influence the court’s willingness to intervene to reverse the effect of the influence is triggered by proof on a balance of probabilities of essentially two matters. The first is that the person at whose expense the impugned transaction was made reposed trust and confidence in the recipient of the benefit conferred by the transaction or that the latter acquired ascendancy or control over the former. The second is that the transaction is of such a size or nature as to call for an explanation as being not readily explicable by the relationship of the parties. Once that stage is reached the burden of proof shifts to the person seeking to uphold the transaction to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the transaction was the result of the free exercise by the transferor of an independent will. The point of the contrast is to highlight the need in cases of actual undue influence to point to some overt act or acts which can be said to be causative of the impugned transaction. The inquiry in the case of presumed undue influence is rather more subtle and the evidence bearing on the influence and its effect is likely to be more indirect.

Unconscionable Dealing

Restraint of trade

Burden of Proof Precedent
   

Mediator Questions

Mediation is the art of knowing how, when and why to ask questions which can bring about a ‘cognitive shift’ in each P’s thinking and behaviour, i.e. a paradigm shift about what they perceive to be at stake and the value of settling. This includes each P’s analysis and evaluation of potential:

  • gains;
  • opportunities;
  • risks;
  • costs (including intangibles e.g. health, relationships, reputation); and
  • losses (including the time-value of money).

Metaphorically, ‘questions’ are the ‘steering-wheel’ whereby a Mediator [‘M’] can navigate a ‘difficult conversation’ with each in order to bring closure by helping each P to sort out their dispute for and by themselves. Within this framework  I have attempted to set out a Mediator’s Toolkit, i.e. a general ‘conceptual framework’ for the structuring of questions by M whilst conducting private sessions with each P, using tools to respond to the challenges that typically arise in the Mediation of a music dispute.

Issue Questions
Parties.
Songwriters.
Band. How and when was the Band formed.
Who are the founding members.
Who does what.
How was the name of the Band chosen.

NB:

·        The name is the brand.

·        ‘Goodwill’ in the name.

Band assets – Who contributed what including loans.
Was a Band Bank Account set up.
What is the legal form & structure of the Band, e. .an LLC or LLP.
LLC:

Articles.

Directors.

Share capital structure.

Shareholder rights.

Rights of pre-emption i.e. if a Band member leaves/dies & method of valuation.

Was a partnership agreement signed.
Have HMRC treated the Band as a general partnership.
Did any Band Member contract through a service company.
Was a Band Agreement signed.
Who is the Manager.
Was there a co-manager.
  Who is the record company
  Who is the Band’s accountant.
  Bank & Accounting Records.
  Advances.
Royalties
  Structuring.
Dispute What legal remedies are being sought.
On what basis.
Band dispute What is the dispute about.
Copyright Who created the musical works in which these rights allegedly exist.
Who contributed what, when, and how to the songwriting process:
Songwriting:
Interpretation:
Performance:
What infringements are alleged.
Music Management Contract Scope & terms.
Was legal advice obtained before signing a Record Contract.
What is being claimed & counterclaimed & by whom.
On what basis – i.e. what breach is alleged & by whom.
Evidence.
Recording contract Was legal advice obtained before signing a Record Contract.
What kind of record deal was agreed:

Term.

Exclusivity.

Territory.

Commitments.

Advances.

Royalties.

Deductions.

Termination.

Royalties How were advances & royalties shared and on what basis.
Songwriter split. What interests are at play.[lvi]
Rights.[lvii]
Power imbalances.[lviii]
Emotional barriers.[lix]
Structural barriers.[lx]
What is at stake
What is the value of what is at stake
What are the litigation & potential costs risks
What is the ‘chance of winning’ multiplied by the ‘net financial gain’ versus the ‘chance of losing’ multiplied by the ‘net financial loss’
What are the benefits of doing a deal? ·        Privacy & Confidentiality.

·        Preserves a working relationship.

·        [Songwriter disputes]

What is a good deal for you
What does the Artist need & prioritise & why Importance of commitment.

Marketing spend.

Importance of creative control:

–      Protecting the integrity of your art.

–      Making a record with minimum interference by the Record Company.

–      Contractual guarantees.

Commitment form the record company – figure for marketing spend.
Importance of money.
What does the Record Company need & prioritise & why i.e. to protect and maximize its investment What are the commercial interests of the Record Company.
What investment has the Record Company made in the Artist.
Financial & creative controls – What restrictions are necessary to protect the Record Company’s interests/investment.
What is the ‘price of doing a deal’ What is the right balance of terms.
What is the ‘commercial gap’
What ‘legal & commercial incentive/leverage’ is there to narrow & close the gap by doing a mutually beneficial deal

Bibliography

Abrahamson, Lawrence and Stephen Bale (1997) To Sample or not to sample? Ent. L.R. 1997, 8(6), 193-196. (‘Abrahamson & Bale’).

Abowd, Daniel Imagine: Could Mediation Systems Fix Songwriter Split Disputes?’ Harvard Negotiation Law Review, [Vol 27:169 Fall 2021]. (‘Abowd’).

Arnold, Richard (2021) Performers’ Rights 6th edition, Sweet & Maxwell. (‘Arnold’).

Baden-Powell,Ed and Jacek Kruza (2020) Sheeran v Chokri: similar facts of plagiarism alleged – strike-out refusal upheld, Ent.L.R. 2020 (3), 110-113. (‘Baden-Powell,Ed & Kruza’).

Bagehot, Richard (1990) Star or slave? Holly Johnson revisited, Ent.L.R. 1990, 1(1), 16-22. (‘Bahgehot’).

Bosher, Hayleigh (2021) Copyright In The Music Industry, Edward Elgar. (‘Bosher’).

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Coote, Jonathan (2022) Ed Sheeran successful in receiving declaration of non-infringement of copyright relating to “Shape of You” in English High Court, E.I.P.R. 2022, 44(8). (‘Coote).

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Eziefula, Nick and Rachael Heeley (2022) Ed Sheeran + no evidence of access = no copyright infringement, Ent.L.R. 2022, 33(6), 220-224. (‘Eziefula & Heeley’).

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Harrison, Ann and Tony Rigg, editors  (2023) The Present And Future Of Music Law, Bloomsbury. (‘Harrison & Rigg’).

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See also:

Cases

Armatrading v. Stone and another [1985] (Unreported]: Undue influence | Lawdit Music

Associated Newspapers v. HRH Prince of Wales [2006] Ch 57 (CA) [‘Associated Newspapers’]. Associated Newspapers Ltd v Prince of Wales: CA 21 Dec 2006 – swarb.co.uk

Beckingham (aka Valentino) v. Hodgens and others [2003]. [‘Beckingham]. See – 13ent04.qxd (entsportslawjournal.com)

Cardi B Case. [‘Cardi B’].  Cardi B Microphone Incident: Rapper Will Not Face Charges – Rolling Stone

Cartier International AG & Others v. British Sky Broadcasting Limited & Others [2016] EWCA 658. [‘Cartier’]: Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 658 | 11 South Square ;Cartier International AG and others (Respondents) v British Telecommunications Plc and another (Appellants)- The Supreme Court

Chance Rapper Case. [‘Chance Rapper’]. Chance the Rapper Sues Ex-Manager Who Sued Him for Millions | Pitchfork

Colonel Bogey Case – Hawkes & Son Limited v. Paramount Film Service Limited [1934]. [‘Hawkes’].  Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd vs Paramount Film … – Lost In Music

Craig Joseph v. Jason Spiller [2009] EWHC 1152 (QB). [‘Craig Joseph’]. Joseph and Others v Spiller and Another – Case Law – VLEX 793867477  ;Microsoft Word – Spiller v Joseph.doc (supremecourt.uk)

Ed Sheeran – ‘Amazing’. [‘Amazing’].  Ed Sheeran previously settled a copyright claim in the US, court told | The Independent

Ed Sheeran – ‘Shape of You. [‘Shape of You’] : Ed Sheeran Awarded $1.1 Million in ‘Shape Of You’ Copyright Case – Billboard

Ed Sheeran – ‘Thinking Out Loud. [‘Thinking Out Loud’]. Ed Sheeran Wins Another “Thinking Out Loud” Copyright Lawsuit | Pitchfork; https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2023/08/ed-sheeran-us-music-copyright.html

Elton John – Elton John and Bernie Taupin and others v. Richard Leon James, Dick James Music Ltd and This Record Company Ltd  [1991] FSR 397: [‘Elton John’].  John v James: ChD 1991 – swarb.co.uk

EMI and others v. BSky B and others [2013]. [‘EMI’]. Maitland Chambers; EMI Records Ltd and Others v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd and Others – Case Law – VLEX 793709033

Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963]. [‘Francis Day’].  Francis Day and Hunter Ltd v Bron: CA 1963 – swarb.co.uk

Gary Marlow v . Exile Productions [2003] EWHC 2631. [‘Gary Marlow’]. Marlow (t/a Crown Hotel) v Exile Productions Ltd (Damages) – Case Law – VLEX 793597721

Gill v. Frankie Goes To Hollywood [2007] 7 WLUK 840. [‘Gill’]: Trade Mark Inter-Partes Decision O/140/07 (ipo.gov.uk)

Gloucester Place Music v. Simon Le Bon [2016] EWHC 3091 (Ch). [‘Gloucester Place’].  Gloucester Place Music Ltd v Le Bon & Ors | [2016] EWHC 3091 (Ch) | England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

Heythrop Zoological Gardens Ltd v Captive Animals Protection Society [2016] [‘Heythrop’]: https://mediawrites.law/no-interim-injunction-against-publication-of-images-featuring-zoo-animals-used-for-entertainment/

HRH Duchess of Sussex v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [2021] EWHC 273 (Ch). [‘Sussex’].  HRH The Duchess of Sussex -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd judgment (judiciary.uk)

James Bourne v. Brandon Davis. [‘Bourne’]. BOURNE TO BE … INFRINGED; LATEST JIPLP – The IPKat (ipkitten.blogspot.com)

Jodie Henderson v. All Around The World Recordings Limited [2014]. [‘Henderson’]. Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd | [2015] IP&T 33 | Intellectual Property Enterprise Court | Judgment | Law | CaseMine; https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff71f60d03e7f57ea8018

Macaulay v. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Limited [1974] 1 WLR 1308, (HL). [‘Macaulay’]. A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay: 1974 – swarb.co.uk

Marcus Gray et al v. Katy Perry: [‘Gray’].  Marcus Gray, et al. v. Katy Perry, et al. | Music Copyright Infringement Resource (gwu.edu)

Mark Taylor v. Rive Droit Music Limited (November 2005) (Unreported). [‘Taylor’].  Taylor v Rive Droit Music Ltd – 5RB Barristers

Max Moseley Case – Max Moseley v. New Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). [‘Moseley’].  Mosley v Associated Newspapers Ltd (judiciary.uk)

Michael Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin et al. [‘Skidmore‘]. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin – Harvard Law Review

Morrison Leahy Music v. Lightbond [1993] EMLR 144. [‘Leahy’]. See – JETIR1809968.pdf

Niema Ash v. Loreena McKennit [2006] EWCA 1714: [‘Ash’]. House of Lords Victory for Loreena McKennitt – Carter-Ruck

O’Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music Limited & Others [1985] Q.B. 428. [‘O’Sullivan ‘] .O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Limited: CA 1985 – swarb.co.uk.

Pharrel Williams, Robin Thicke and Ti v. Bridgeport Music Inc et al. [‘Williams’]. Pharrell Williams et al v. Bridgeport Music Inc et al (law360.com)

Performing Right Society Limited v Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. [2020] EWHC 1872 (Ch): High Court Judgment Template (bailii.org).

Robyn Rihanna Fenty v. Arcadia Group Brands Limited (t/a Topshop) [2013] EWHC 2310 (Ch). [‘Rihanna’].  Robyn Rihanna Fenty and Others -v- Arcadia Group Brands Limited and Others judgment (judiciary.uk)

SABAM v. Scarlett. [‘SABAM’]. EUR-Lex – 62010CJ0070 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu)

Sawkins v. Hyperion Records [2005] EWCA Civ 565 [‘Sawkins’]: Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins – 5RB Barristers

Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593. [‘Re S’]. House of Lords – In re S (FC) (a child) (Appellant) (parliament.uk)

Rebekha vardy v. Collen Rooney [2022]. ([Vardy’). https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Vardy-v-Rooney-Trial-Judgment.pdf

Sara Cox v. Sunday People Newspaper (Reported in the Guaradin  9 June 2005), [‘Cox’]. Sara Cox wins privacy case | Media | The Guardian

Sony Music Entertainment et al v.Cox Communications Inc.et al. [‘Sony’]. Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications | Loeb & Loeb LLP

The ABBA Case – Lyngstad v. Annabas Productions Ltd [1977] FSR 62: [‘ABBA’]. See – Gilchrist | Trade Mark Strategies of Emerging Music Artists | Entertainment and Sports Law Journal (entsportslawjournal.com)

The A Whiter Shade Of Pale Case – Matthew Fisher v. Gary Brooker [2006] EWHC 3239 (Ch); [2009] UKHL 41 (30 July 2009): [‘Fisher’]. Fisher v Brooker & Onward Music Ltd – 5RB Barristers; Fisher v Brooker and Others: HL 30 Jul 2009 – swarb.co.uk

The Author of a Blog v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB). [‘Blog’]. The Author of A Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd: QBD 16 Jun 2009 – swarb.co.uk

The Beloved Case – Hyperion Records Limited v. Warner Music (UK) Ltd [1991]. [‘Beloved’];  What Is a Copyright Work? (uq.edu.au);

The Blue Case [‘Blue’]. BBC NEWS | Entertainment | Music | Blue case judge shows his colours

The Cure Case – Tolhurst v. Smith and Others [1994] EMLR 508. [‘Cure’]. LONDON REPORT: The Cure is set to… – Los Angeles Times (latimes.com)

The Eddie Irvine Case – Irvine and Another v. Talksport Limited [2002]. [‘Irvine’]. Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 423 Case Summary (oxbridgenotes.co.uk)

The Elizabeth Jagger Case. [‘Jagger’] Jagger v Darling & Ors | [2005] EWHC 683 (Ch) | England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

The Elvis Presley Case – re Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543. [‘Elvis’]. https://cms-lawnow.com/en/ealerts/1998/06/brands-merchandising-and-the-elvis-presley-case

The George Michael Case – Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited [1994] EMLR 220. [‘George Michael’]. Panayiotou and Others v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd: ChD 21 Jul 1993 – swarb.co.uk

The Footballer Case – A v. B & C [2002] EMLR 21. [‘Footballer’]. A v B [2002] 2 All ER 545 (lawteacher.net)

The Frankie Goes To Hollywood Case – Perfect Songs Limited v. Johnson and Others [1993] EMLR 61. [‘Frankie’]. See also: Why Frankie, Elton and Gilbert went to court | Articles | Zang Tuum Tumb and all that (zttaat.com)

The Jamie Theakston Case – Theakston v. MGN Ltd [2002] QB EMLR 22. [‘Theakston’]. Theakston v MGN Ltd: QBD 14 Feb 2002 – swarb.co.uk

The Naomi Campbell Case – Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. [‘Campbell’].  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 (6 May 2004) (bailii.org)

The One Direction Case [‘One Direction’]. One Direction’s Label Sued Over Band Name | News | MTV

The Pink Floyd case [‘Pink Floyd’]: https://forum.songfacts.com/index.php?/topic/3793-pink-floyd-session-singer-wins-settlement/

The Lady Antebellum Case [‘Lady Antebellum’]. https://www.billboard.com/business/legal/lady-antebellum-a-name-change-lawsuits-settlement-1235025794/

The Liberty X Case – Keith Floyd Sutherland v. V2 Music and Ors [2002] EWHC 14 (Ch). [‘Liberty X’]. Sutherland & Ors v V2 Music & Ors | [2002] EWHC 14 (Ch) | England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

The Ludlow Case – Ludlow Music Inc v. (1) Robert P. Williams, (2) Guy Chambers, (3) EMI Music Publishing  Limited, (4) BMG Music Publishing Limited [2000]./ [‘Ludlow’]. Ludlow Music Inc v Williams & Ors | [2001] FSR 19 | England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

The Michael Douglas Case – Michael Douglas, Catherine Zeta-Jones, Northern & Shell Limited v. Hello! Ltd [2001] EMLR 199. [‘Douglas’]. Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) – Case Law – VLEX 792679089

The Oasis Case – Creation Records Limited v. News Group Limited [1997] EMLR 444. [‘Oasis’]. Creation Records Ltd. & Ors v News Group Newspapers Ltd | [1997] EWHC Ch 370 | England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

The Status Quo Case – Lancaster v. Handle Artists Management Ltd [2008] EWCA 1111. [‘Status Quo’]. Lancaster & Anor v Handle Artists Management Ltd & Ors | [2008] EWCA Civ 1111 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

Tom Waits Case [‘Waits’]. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/communications/waits.html

The Walmsley Case – Richard Walmsley v. Acid Jazz Records Limited [2000]. [‘Walmsley’]. COPYRIGHT – MUSICAL WORKS | Solicitors Humphreys

The Wayne Rooney Case – Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney [2010] EWHC 1807 QB (‘Wayne Rooney’). Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney and another – Case Law – VLEX 793652429

The P Diddy Case – Richard Dearlove v. Sean Combes [2007] EWHC 375 (Ch). [‘P Diddy’]. Dearlove (Richard) v Combs (Sean) – Case Law – VLEX 793579385

The Robbie Williams Management Case – Martin-Smith v. Williams [1997] (Unreported): [‘Williams’]. Pop star’s legal defeat could cost him pounds 1m | The Independent | The Independent; WILLIAMS’ MILLIONS (nme.com)

The Seal Case – John Wadlow v. Haney Olusegun Adeola Samuel [2006] EWHC 1492 (QB) June 2006. [‘Seal’]. Seal ordered to pay commission to ex-manager (swanturton.com); Samuel (Professionally Known as Seal) v Wadlow – Case Law – VLEX 793967497

The Spandau Ballet Case – Hadley and Others v. Kemp and Another [1999] (Ch). [‘Spandau Ballet’]. Hadley v Kemp: 1999 – swarb.co.uk

The Spice Girls Case – Halliwell & Others v. Panini [1997] (Unreported). [‘Halliwell’]. See – marilynmonroeposhspiceandme.pdf (ed.ac.uk); https://marketinglaw.osborneclarke.com/marketing-techniques/a-fortune-out-of-fame/

The Spice Girls v. Aprila World Service BV [2000]. [‘Spice Girls’]. Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service Bv: ChD 24 Feb 2000 – swarb.co.uk

The Springsteen Case – Springsteen v. Flute International Limited & Ors [1998] (Ch). [’Springsteen’]. Springsteen v Flute International Ltd and Others: PatC 10 Dec 1998 – swarb.co.uk

Trim (t/a Trim Productions & Victim Records) v. Bobb [2022] EWCA Civ 62. [‘Gabrielle’]: Trim (t/a Trim Productions & Victim Records) v Bobb (pka Gabrielle) & Ors [2002] EWCA Civ 62 (24 January, 2002) (bailii.org)

Starbucks (HK) Ltd (and others) v. British Sky Group plc [2012] EWHC 3074 (Ch). [‘Starbucks’].  Starbucks (HK) Limited and another(Appellants) v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc and others (Respondents) – The Supreme Court

The Stone Roses Publishing Dispute – Zomba v. Mountfield and others [1993] EMLR 15. [‘Zomba’]. See also: Rights reversion and contract adjustment – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

The Taylor Swift Case (2020). [‘Swift’]. https://www.nme.com/news/music/taylor-swift-has-shake-it-off-copyright-lawsuit-dismissed-before-trial-3365900

The Tyler Armes Case. [‘Armes ‘].Post Malone Settles ‘Circles’ Songwriting Lawsuit Just Before Trial – Billboard

Trent Reznor Management Dispute. [‘Trent’]. Reznor Wins Suit Against Former Manager – Billboard

The Wet Wet Wet Case – Bravado Merchandising Services Ltd v. Mainstream Publishing (Edinburgh) Ltd [1990] FSR 205. [‘Bravado’]. Bravado Merchandising Services Ltd v Mainstream Publishing (Edinburgh) Ltd: SCS 1996 – swarb.co.uk

Warner Music Limited and Others v. de Wilde [1987]. [‘Warner’]. Warner Bros Music vs de Wilde – Lost In Music

Warner Music UK Ltd v TuneIn Inc [2021] [‘WM UK’]: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Warner-v-TuneIn-judgment.pdf

Williamson Music Limited v. The Pearson Partnership and Another [1987] FSR 97. [‘Williamson’].  Williamson Music vs The Pearson Partnership … – Lost In Music

Zang Tumb Recordings Limited and Perfect Songs Limited v. Holly Johnson [1983] EMLR (6). [‘Zang’]. Zang Tumb Tuum Records Ltd & Anor v Johnson | [1993] EMLR 61 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) | Judgment | Law | CaseMine

See also: